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# Current History

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DECEMBER, 1977

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# Current History

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# Current History

DECEMBER, 1977

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*In this issue, specialists evaluate changing conditions in the nations of Africa, as the tensions mount between the black Africans and white southern Africans. As our introductory article points out, "Because Africa is apparently the least stable area of the world, an unorthodox United States foreign policy may be necessary, a policy characterized by open diplomacy and an emphasis on shared moral values like human rights."*

## United States Policy in Africa

BY RICHARD E. BISSELL

*Visiting Professor of Political Science, Temple University*

ONE of United States President Jimmy Carter's first appointees in January, 1977, was an ambassador to the United Nations: former Congressman Andrew Young (D., Ga.), who was active in the American civil rights movement and dedicated to bringing a new look to American foreign policy toward Africa and toward the third world in general. Early in 1977, the new administration made many public statements about its innovative foreign policy: "instilling an American sense of justice in foreign policy," "making foreign policy an open process," and "putting human rights at the top of the agenda in African policy and elsewhere."

The highly publicized African policy of the new administration raised a number of questions. Were Ambassador Young and President Carter talking about a *radically* different policy? When they tried to implement it, what was the reaction in Africa and in the United States? What have they accomplished? To answer such questions, traditional United States policy must be remembered.

The last 10 months of the administration of President Gerald Ford and the reign of Secretary of State Henry

Kissinger witnessed the first revolution in United States diplomacy toward Africa.<sup>1</sup> The United States failure to block Soviet/Cuban influence and revolution in Angola shook the foreign policy establishment in the United States. The implicit threat to all United States interests in Africa, economic, trade, investment, strategic, and political, was clear. The influence of Communist states in Africa had never before been so strong; it was previously limited to a few minor military facilities (in Guinea and Somalia). The advent of the Cubans and Russians in Angola and Mozambique marked a new era. In response to that situation, many Americans considered it time to abandon a traditional axiom of United States-African policy, i.e., that Europeans should take the lead in setting Western policy toward Africa.

The principal effect of changing American perceptions of the quality of European leadership in Africa, which involved establishing American leadership, was the personal involvement of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. His penchant for shuttle diplomacy, so well applied in the Middle East, was lavished on the problems of southern Africa in mid-1976 without positive result.

Kissinger's effectiveness was limited to a large degree by the existence of National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39, and the "historic tilt" toward South Africa.<sup>2</sup> Any African leader who had read the text of NSSM 39 and knew that it reflected Kissinger's personal views realized that Kissinger did not regard Africa as valuable in itself. Indeed, he had no desire to become involved in African problems;<sup>3</sup> Africa was only one aspect of *global* problems and a fairly minor

<sup>1</sup>For a preliminary assessment, see W.A.E. Skurnik, "Africa and the Superpowers," *Current History*, vol. 51, no. 421 (November, 1976), pp. 145ff.

<sup>2</sup>National Security Study Memorandum 39, a classified policy study leaked to the press in 1974: see Mohamed El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, eds., *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976).

<sup>3</sup>For the repudiation of this view by the Carter Administration, see the speech by Secretary of State Vance to the NAACP, July 1, 1977.



one at that, until the Soviet Union intervened in Angola on a massive scale.

In many small ways, Henry Kissinger viewed Africa from the same perspective as early Portuguese mariners, seeing it as a large obstacle to be circumnavigated on the way to a larger goal—for the early explorers, Asia, and for Kissinger, global understanding with the Soviet Union. When Kissinger chose to favor the South Africans, he was permanently suspect in African eyes.

A second problem Kissinger faced was the African leaders' need to conduct diplomacy openly. There are few countries in Africa where the control of the government is strong enough to enable the government to conduct negotiations secretly and to enforce the resulting decisions. In dealing with the liberation movements of southern Africa, in particular, the control of political leaders over military guerrilla groups is far too weak to give the political leaders the power to negotiate with an "honest broker" like Kissinger. Thus Kissinger found it difficult to negotiate with the leaders of the "Front Line States," Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola, since they could not impose their decisions on the liberation movements. And he found it equally difficult to negotiate with the leaders of the liberation movements, since they did not always control the guerrilla bands. Out of frustration, therefore, he found that Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa was his most congenial negotiating partner.

Because of his good working relationship with Vorster and his own approach to diplomacy, Kissinger believed in step-by-step solutions that entailed linked compromises. Kissinger maintained that the interested parties, whether American, European, or African, could not simultaneously tackle all the sources of instability in southern Africa. Instead, he approached the most prominent issue, then Rhodesia, and asked all parties to help in defusing that issue. His approach made it necessary for black African leaders to work with the United States and with South African leaders to negotiate a controlled, evolutionary answer in Rhodesia. The result of his diplomacy was the agreement of September 21, 1976, whereby Prime Minister Ian Smith of Rhodesia agreed to a joint proposal made by Kissinger and Vorster to transfer power to a multiracial government over a period of two years. This agreement was concluded in a manner that expressed the Kissinger approach:

(1) Vorster was a guarantor of the agreement and was also recognized to be a prime force in persuading Smith to accept the proposal, given South Africa's control over the sanctions-busting transit routes for Rhodesian goods;

(2) Kissinger thought that the black Front Line leaders had also agreed to the proposal, in the hope that they could enforce it on the liberation movements. Only later did the Front Line leaders disavow the agreement.

(3) Kissinger suggested to Vorster that the United States would not raise the issue of change in South Africa or Namibia until the Rhodesian issue was settled—thereby giving Vorster time to undertake the types of change he desired in South Africa without United States pressure. Vorster thus felt he was getting something in return for putting pressure on Smith.

Underlying the Kissinger approach was a willingness to recognize the need for change, coupled with a determined belief that change should be controlled and non-violent—a delicate, political balance that is not easy in the most sophisticated policy environment.

Kissinger left office with his Rhodesian agreement unfulfilled and with instability in southern Africa causing even greater concern than in the past. But his personal involvement did, at least, stimulate debate in the United States about the goals and processes of United States foreign policy in Africa. And in initiating that debate, Kissinger freed United States policy from some shackles of the past. The United States no longer deferred to European opinion on African problems and it recognized that an ostrich-like policy was no longer viable. African conflicts would involve United States interests, and the new administration would have to find a way to defend those interests.

### THE CARTER-YOUNG INITIATIVES

The most important step undertaken by the incoming President in January, 1977, was offering the post of United Nations Ambassador to Andrew Young, who accepted the post and claimed responsibility for United States policy in Africa as well. The new administration thus took a major new tack, in style if not in substance, in formulating a new foreign policy in Africa.

The symbolism in appointing Young was clear: the United States had a black man in charge of its policy in Africa. He would deal not only with the black regimes in Africa but with the white-dominated governments of South Africa and Rhodesia. Diplomatic negotiations would no longer be conducted to please the South Africans. Discussions would be laid on the press table. Events in 1977 demonstrated the discomfort these moves caused the South Africans.

The second step undertaken by the administration would be largely symbolic: the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. The original measure, sponsored by Democratic Senator Harry Byrd, Jr., of Virginia in 1971, had allowed for exceptional imports of chrome from Rhodesia into the United States, thereby contravening the sanctions voted by the United Nations. Although dozens of nations carried on a lively, if surreptitious, trade with Rhodesia after 1965, the United States suffered the embarrassment of doing legally what other nations did covertly. Even when the Byrd Amendment was in force, various American importers discovered that the chrome they imported from Japan, South Africa, or the Soviet Union was on occasion

re-exported Rhodesian chrome. As a symbolic gesture to the black Africans, however, President Carter strongly backed the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, which was accomplished in the summer of 1977.

Finally, the new administration established an agenda of foreign policy goals in Africa that consisted of one item only: the implementation of human rights. Such a priority was first perceived to be a revolution in United States diplomacy, a throwback to the priorities of President Woodrow Wilson, particularly when the doctrine was applied to a region like Africa, where respect for human rights has played little part in recorded African history. The human rights policy was interpreted immediately as a slap at the white governments of southern Africa—in effect, a message from President Carter that his first priority would be the installation of black governments throughout southern Africa. This impression was encouraged by both Young and President Carter. And analysis of the new policy included all possible motives: the need to repay the American black community for its support during the 1976 election campaign, a sincere Christian view of African-American relations, or possibly a desire to re-enact the United States civil rights struggle on foreign soil.

#### HOW EFFECTIVE IS YOUNG?

Given the priority ascribed to human rights, however, what actually happened to American policy in succeeding months? Was it possible to effect a revolution in American diplomacy? The record shows, by and large, that Young in practice was not so different from Kissinger in practice.

Ambassador Young spent much of 1977 in Africa. He needed to reassure the leaders of black Africa about President Carter's intentions, and to obtain their support of his initiatives in southern Africa. The principal topic of Young's conversations was Rhodesia: the scene of the most violent conflict in southern Africa, and the country where the decisions of the independent black leaders of Africa might have the greatest impact. The major African leaders, Young discovered, were President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and General Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. What these leaders had in common was a certain skepticism about United States goals in Africa. Was the United States merely interested in arresting Soviet influence, or was there a stronger commitment to justice and development in the region? Beyond these concerns, however, the two leaders presented very different challenges to Young's diplomacy.

<sup>4</sup>For his view of U.S. policy, see Julius Nyerere, "America and Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 55 (July, 1977), pp. 671-684.

<sup>5</sup>The economic role of Nigeria in U.S. planning, as opposed to that of South Africa, is argued by William J. Foltz, "United States Policy toward Southern Africa: Economic and Strategic Constraints," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 92 (Spring, 1977), pp. 47-64.

Nyerere was one of the fathers of African independence.<sup>4</sup> In his public image, he also expressed the African desire to stand apart from superpower disputes and to be free of "neo-colonial" bondage. Most important, Nyerere controls the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and thus has major influence over the flow of money and arms to the guerrilla movements of Rhodesia and southern Africa. He does not have sole control, needless to say; if he attempted to thwart the efforts of the guerrilla movements in the Liberation Committee, the arms flow would be routed instead through Mozambique or Angola, or elsewhere. But through the OAU he is influential in determining the political direction of the liberation movements. Young thus needed Nyerere's cooperation in case a negotiated settlement could be reached with the white government in Rhodesia. And in the meantime, Nyerere could exercise a great deal of influence in determining the extent of Cuban and Soviet participation in the Rhodesian struggle.

Obasanjo occupied a rather different role. The leader of Africa's richest and largest state, in the last few years Obasanjo has indicated a willingness to alter Nigeria's traditional introspection. The future of Africa as a whole now interests Obasanjo and Nigeria's military leadership. And perhaps most important, Nigeria possesses an army large enough to have an impact on Africa's military future. In addition, Nigeria is now the second largest exporter of petroleum to the United States.<sup>5</sup> Even though the United States could obtain its petroleum elsewhere, the United States hopes that Nigeria will not begin playing politics with her oil, like the Middle East nations.

Andrew Young thus perceived the Nigerian-United States relationship as important economically and politically, because Nigeria's wealth can be translated into political power in Africa and abroad. Young thus appeared anxious to keep Obasanjo informed and in tune with United States policy objectives and—always unstated—to keep Nigerian armed forces from intervening on the side of the Rhodesian guerrillas.

Thus Ambassador Young was careful to offer Nigeria some form of participation in the Rhodesian settlement. Most often, Young mentioned that Nigerian troops might serve as a "peacekeeping force" during the transitional period between white rule and majority government. This proposal was made informally. Nonetheless, no Rhodesian settlement was achieved.

(Continued on page 224)

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**Richard E. Bissell** published two books in 1977 on African international relations, *Apartheid and International Organizations* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press), and *Southern Africa in the World: Autonomy or Interdependence* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute). He is managing editor of *Orbis*.

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*"Divisions in Arab North Africa are varied and complex; their origins lie in the nature of the political systems that were fashioned in the period immediately after Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya secured their independence, in the divergent ideologies of their ruling elites, and in the personal rivalries of their leaders."*

## North Africa: The Eye of the Storm

BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS

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THE northern littoral of Africa is caught up, once again, in local rivalries and conflicts. Within a span of weeks during the summer of 1977, Egyptian and Libyan armies collided in bloody warfare. During the same period, Libya was embroiled in controversy with Tunisia and Chad over territorial boundaries; and Moroccan relations with Algeria had disintegrated in a dispute over the disposition of former Spanish territories in the Western Sahara.

This spiral of violence has shattered the hope for close political and economic association that the leaders of the region had heralded in the early 1970's. In that period, they had bruited the possibility of a North African federation, in which the economic resources and potentialities of the region would be shared. Instead, the wheel of controversy has turned and prospects for accommodation have dimmed substantially.

When viewing the contemporary scene, Arab intellectuals are inclined to hark back to the melancholy words of At-Tabari:

'Umar said to Salmān: "Am I a King or a Caliph?" And Salmān answered: "If you have levied from the lands of the Muslims one dirham, or more, or less, and applied it unlawfully, you are a King, not a Caliph." And 'Umar wept.<sup>1</sup>

Divisions in Arab North Africa are varied and complex; their origins lie in the nature of the political systems that were fashioned in the period immediately after Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya secured their independence, in the divergent ideologies of their ruling elites, and in the personal rivalries of their leaders.

Conventional wisdom holds that we live in an age of nation-building, one in which one billion or more people of the so-called third world are striving with varying degrees of success to fashion modern, viable

communities. As Lucien Pye has pointed out: "This is . . . a time of faith in the miraculous powers of politics." The process involves the definition of new goals, the emergence of new political formations, and the establishment of new values that will place effective limits on competitive politics.

The recent history of North Africa suggests that this view is overly optimistic. During the past quarter of a century, North Africa has emerged from the colonial shadows to follow a course intended to shore up the foundations of each nation. The process, however, has been spasmodic, traumatic and far from reassuring. Political leadership has been based on the cult of personality; personal freedoms have been heavily circumscribed; few lasting institutions have been established; and hopes born when freedom was won<sup>2</sup> have given way to a sense of limitation and alienation.

Nowhere are these difficulties more evident than in the revolutionary states of Algeria and Libya. Under President Houari Boumedienne and Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, Algeria and Libya have followed different ideological paths. Algeria has pursued an étatist socialist path; Libya, on the other hand, has adopted an Islamic fundamentalist path. Whatever their professed ideological approach, both have a wealth of resources at their disposal, neither suffers from the problems of overpopulation, and both have the potential to play an influential role in Arab and African councils. Yet both Algeria and Libya have fallen short of their potential.

In Algeria, there are a number of mitigating circumstances. Algeria experienced seven years of war before severing her ties with France in July, 1962. Subsequently, a deeply divided nationalist leadership faced the challenge of reconstruction. Internecine fights within the National Liberation Front (FLN) brought Algeria to the brink of civil war. Ahmed Ben Bella finally emerged as the man of the hour, but his hour was all too short. An emotional chieftain, he could not unite the country; he preferred foreign adventures and the

<sup>1</sup>*Ta'Rikh ar-Rusul wa'l-Mulūk*

<sup>2</sup>Libya acquired her independence in 1951, Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, and Algeria in 1962.

rhetoric of revolution to the role of architect and peace-maker.

Ben Bella was overthrown by his Minister of Defense, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, on June 19, 1965. Boumedienne has brought tranquility, restored order and established the foundations for economic growth. On the other hand, political control in Algeria remains in the hands of a narrow oligarchy, and the average Algerian has no sense of political participation. Few have a stake in the preservation of the political system. As an observer has recently noted: "There is in Algeria today the air of a revolution that has failed—badly."

The Libyan revolution began on September 1, 1969, when the government of King Idris was toppled by a group of military "putschists" led by Muammar Qaddafi. A religious fundamentalist by background and political persuasion, Qaddafi has attempted to purge Libyan society of Western—materialist—secular impulses. The laws of the Koran have been reestablished, and the regime has attempted to create a society based on the interpretation of Islamic socialism, as enunciated by the "Leader"—Qaddafi.

Qaddafi provides leadership by means of "national guidance," in the form of dictates enumerated in his "Five Main Points of Unique Revolutionary Experience." These points may be capsulized as follows:

- The rewriting of all laws mandated by the regime of King Idris.
- The continuous purge of bourgeois elements opposed to the revolution.
- The control of all forms of freedom of expression that threaten to undermine the revolution.
- The periodic removal of government officials to "avoid their isolation from the masses."
- The perpetuation of the "cultural revolution" to eliminate from Libyan society all "imported cultural ideas."

Whatever his dedication to the transformation of Libyan society, Qaddafi makes it clear that his primary interest is Arab issues—Palestine, Arab unity and the "battle of destiny." The concepts of Islam and pan-Arabism, as interpreted by the Libyan leader, are essentially xenophobic and seek to diminish Western, Communist, and other foreign influences. Qaddafi contends that Zionism is the outstanding example of a "foreign presence." Because Israel is the prime enemy of the Arab world, Qaddafi supports the extremist wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization, African nations willing to break diplomatic ties with Israel, and dissident groups wishing to overthrow more moderate African and Arab leaders.

Colonel Qaddafi perceives a major role for Libya as an Arab unifier and policymaker. He has sought, thus far in vain, to form political federations with neighboring Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. His most spectacular attempt came in 1973-1974 when he tried to federate his government with the government of Egypt

under President Anwar Sadat, but the effort foundered because of conflicts over foreign policy and the distribution of ministerial portfolios, and because of basic differences in temperament and outlook. Nevertheless, Qaddafi continues to view Egypt as the touchstone of his hopes for Arab unity. Because of her size, geographic location, and human resources, Egypt has the potential to play the seminal role in dealing with Israel and Zionism.

The more moderate outlook evidenced by the government of Anwar Sadat on issues ranging from accommodation with the Western world to willingness to accept Israel's presence as a Middle Eastern state has provoked and outraged Qaddafi. With the failure of his efforts to achieve the political unification of Libya and Egypt, Qaddafi adopted a policy clearly intended to subvert the Egyptian government in 1975-1976. He appealed to the Egyptian military to intervene against President Sadat, he approached student groups and conservative religious organizations, and, most recently, he launched outright terrorist campaigns.

The provocations became intolerable by June-July, 1977; thus, after a series of bombings in Cairo, Egyptian and Libyan forces were locked in battle along the northern reaches of their common frontier. Five days of conflict involved air raids on local air bases, collisions between infantry forces of brigade size, and heavy skirmishes between armored units. After the intercession of Algeria's President Boumedienne, a cease-fire was established. However, relations remain uneasy and the resumption of hostilities is a not improbable contingency.

The issues that divide Egypt and Libya are too profound to be resolved through normal processes of reconciliation. It is clear that Qaddafi will use any stratagem to overturn President Sadat, including recourse to the Soviet Union for modern military equipment, advisers (of which there are more than 1,000 in Libya now), and technical assistance. The fact that his army was bloodied in combat with superior Egyptian forces is not likely to dissuade Qaddafi from continuing attacks, direct and indirect, against the Egyptian President—whatever the implications of these efforts for Arab unity. With more oil wealth than she can reasonably absorb, Libya will obviously continue to play a spoiler's role under Qaddafi, but the continuation of provocative actions may redound to the ultimate disadvantage of the present Libyan leadership. In due course, the Egyptian government may feel compelled to seek more drastic remedies than those adopted in July, 1977.

Potentially more serious is the warfare that has erupted in the Western Sahara in the past several years. Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria are embroiled in this conflict—Algeria indirectly through her support of the Polisario movement.

The basic issue in the Western Sahara is the right of



the largely nomadic inhabitants of the former Spanish Sahara to determine their own future. Under a complicated formula sanctioned by the United Nations, Spain, the ruling colonial power, agreed in 1975 to a plebiscite before divesting herself of responsibility for the affairs of her Western Saharan ward. Morocco and Mauritania, however, entertained their own territorial ambitions and occupied and divided the erstwhile Spanish enclave in mid-1975. This action outraged the local inhabitants, a number of whom fled to Algeria. From their refugee camps they have launched a guerrilla campaign, intended to restore the territory to their own control, under the banner of the Polisario Front.

The war in the Western Sahara has intensified, with raiding forces harassing local garrisons and even conducting a skirmish against the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott. As a result, a Moroccan-Mauritanian defense treaty has been concluded and Moroccan forces have been dispatched to Mauritania. The latter has increased the size of her own armed forces to over 15,000 men, a not inconsiderable burden for a nation with a population of less than 700,000, with limited transportation and communications facilities.

The war has shadowed Moroccan relations with Algeria. Neither close nor harmonious for some time, Moroccan-Algerian relations have plummeted in the wake of increased Algerian support for the Polisario Front. Algeria has insisted that the Arab League and the Organization for African Unity (OAU) should intervene to assure the rights of the local inhabitants, much to the dismay of Morocco and Mauritania. Because of the nature of the conflict, the OAU has agreed to mediate and has called for a summit meeting of African principals at Lusaka (Zambia) in late 1977.

Events in the Western Sahara have set back efforts made by Morocco and Algeria in 1975 to compose past differences, which had emerged in 1962 when the Moroccan monarchy, under King Hassan, laid claim to Algerian frontier districts in the Sahara. The result was a brief but punishing border war in the Tindouf region that found Algerian forces at a severe disadvantage and led the Ben Bella government to turn to the Soviet Union for arms. Repeated efforts were made to normalize relations since the cessation of hostilities; they foundered because of mutual suspicions engendered by differences in the political philosophies of Algerian socialist leaders and the Moroccan throne.

However, by mid-1975 it appeared that these differences would be reconciled. On July 4, 1975, after a four-day visit to Rabat by the Algerian Foreign Minister, a joint communiqué was issued:

- Algeria repeated that she had no claim on Saharan territory;
- Rabat and Algiers expressed their determination to move ahead with common economic projects;
- Algeria expressed full satisfaction with regard to the future disposition of Spanish Sahara.

In short, Algeria appeared to be withdrawing from her earlier position on Spanish Sahara—self-determination for the people of the territory through a referendum organized and held under United Nations auspices. In exchange, Morocco seemed to have agreed that she would ratify a 1972 border agreement, thus bringing a rancorous issue to harmonious conclusion. Also in prospect was an Algerian-Moroccan agreement to proceed with the joint exploitation of the Gara-Djebilet iron ore deposits near the Algerian border.

These expectations were shattered by the Moroccan-Mauritanian occupation of the Spanish Sahara. While Algeria has registered little success in the Arab League in her efforts to garner support for a referendum and commanding role for the Polisario Front, the Boumedienne government will probably continue to lend diplomatic support to the front, and the situation in the Western Sahara will probably deteriorate further. In this event, the rivalries that have doomed efforts at regional cooperation among Maghrebian leaders will provide fuel for added conflict.

#### MOROCCAN MODERATES

To bolster his domestic support, King Hassan has begun to rule in accord with parliamentary consensus once again. In June, 1965, he had disbanded Parliament and set the constitution aside, after a series of union-organized strikes in Casablanca and elsewhere. For the next 12 years, Morocco was an absolute monarchy. However, a series of attempted coups in the 1970's underscored the fragility of Hassan's personal rule.

In 1976, the King altered the basis of government in Morocco by announcing a return to the electoral process and the reestablishment of parliamentary government. The new Parliament was elected in June, 1977, reflecting King Hassan's desire for progress toward broader participation in government. The full spectrum of political parties, from supporters of the monarchy to the local Communist party, participated fully in the elections, and it is evident that even the opposition parties are planning to return to the political mainstream.

The Parliament will convene in October. At this juncture, only the most optimistic observer would assume that the return of Parliament spells the beginning of a smooth transition to a new political system in which power will be shared equitably.

During the transition, King Hassan has indicated  
(Continued on page 224)

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**William H. Lewis** has taught at George Washington University and the University of Michigan and writes frequently for professional journals. He is editor and co-author of *New Forces in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964) and *French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity* (New York: Walker & Co., 1965).



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*"In view of actual or potential sources of conflict and radical change, the Eastern Horn presents a dismal picture."*

# Conflict in the African Horn

BY FERAIDOON SHAMS B.

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THE triangular northeastern corner of Africa, known as the Eastern Horn, controls the southern entrance to the Red Sea, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb.<sup>1</sup> With the reopening of the Suez Canal, on June 5, 1975, it has regained some of the strategic importance lost when India achieved independence.

The Eastern Horn is an area of approximately 332,150,000 square miles. It embraces parts of Ethiopia, all of Somalia and the recently independent Djibouti. Vast plateaus rising from sea level to 13,500 feet in Ethiopia and deep panoramic declivities bordered by forbidding expanses of sun-drenched volcanic rocks and deserts are the outstanding physiographic features of this mostly desolate region. The inhabitants of the area provide a kaleidoscopic variety; there are some 33,500,000 people, most of whom live in Ethiopia, about 3,500,000 in the Somali Republic, and roughly 150,000 in Djibouti. This area borders the Sudan, with an area of 967,000 square miles occupied by almost

18,000,000 people, and Kenya, with 224,960 square miles and about 13,500,000 people.

Ideological incompatibility, territorial claims and counterclaims and competing external interests in the Horn have led to tensions and unending and violent armed conflicts. Clashes between Somalia and Ethiopia over Ogaden and Haud, Eritrean irredenta, radically shifting alliances and other factors have added to the political instability.

Historically, the situation in the Horn has been even more complex. Incessant hostility and suspicion have characterized relations from colonial times to the present: constant skirmishing between Somalia and Ethiopia over Ethiopian territories allegedly inhabited by some 500,000 Somalis; rivalry over the recently independent, strategic Djibouti; Ethiopian claims to boundaries established under the Anglo-Ethiopian and Italian-Ethiopian agreements; and the Somali claims to the northeastern third of Kenya, among other issues.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, Soviet-supported Ethiopia is engaged in a boundary dispute with the Western-oriented Sudan (delimited under the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian treaty), and accuses the Sudan and some Arab states (notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt) of supporting the Eritrean separatists. The Sudan itself suffers from lingering tensions between the Arab north and the black south, although the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, which granted limited autonomy to the south, has diminished the tensions somewhat.

## CONFLICTING INTERESTS

The African Horn has been always a stage of competing political interests. European empire builders conceived a hierarchy of "superiority" and "inferiority," with various degrees of "equality" depending on the people's potential "for freedom and enterprise," meaning the possibility of their "development" or, more accurately, exploitation. The colonizers were convinced that acting as "yeast and leaven" was part of their historical destiny.<sup>3</sup>

These pronouncements by the West European powers and their subsequent claims to lands adjacent to

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<sup>1</sup>The Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb (Arabic: Gate of Tears) connects the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea. It includes the strategic islands of Perim and Socotra; the former is situated approximately 100 miles west of Aden. Today, these islands, together with Kamaran, are part of South Yemen. The Red Sea is an important sea lane, linking Asia, Europe and Africa, through the ports of Massawa and Sudan on the west coast of the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba by way of Sinai and the Strait of Tiran, and the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal.

<sup>2</sup>Ethiopia is the oldest sovereign state in Africa. The former British Somaliland Protectorate became independent on June 25, 1960, and five days later, merged with the Trust Territory of Somaliland (previously Italian Somaliland) into the sovereign Republic of Somalia. It occupies some 246,000 square miles and has a coastline of approximately 1,880 miles with the Indian Ocean. See Anthony S. Reyner, "Somalia: The Problems of Independence," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 14, no. 3 (Summer, 1960), pp. 247-48; and Leo Silberman, "Ethiopia: Power of Moderation," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 14, no. 2 (Spring, 1960), pp. 141-53.

<sup>3</sup>Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny, *Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1968), p. 3.

the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea promoted their own security and established their supremacy over possible rivals.

Once the French opened the Suez Canal in 1869, Great Britain became involved in the political affairs of the lands contiguous to the Red Sea, if for no other reason than to protect the vital route to India. Italian interests in Eritrea, in Ethiopia (then Abyssinia), and Mijurtein and Obbia had also persisted for decades.<sup>4</sup>

France had manifested interest in the Red Sea area since the 1830's, but had no plans for a systematic development at first. Later, however, in order to avoid increasing naval dependence on the British facilities along the southern Red Sea, France needed a coaling station along the route to Madagascar and Indochina. As a result, in 1862, France signed a treaty with the Afars to cede to France territories and facilities at Obock, from Ras Doumeira in the north to Ras Ali in the south. Thereafter, French interest in the area increased and extended to the coastal fringes of the Gulf of Tadjoura.<sup>5</sup>

In 1888, the French treaty with Britain extended France's holdings eastward. Later, France established colonial rule in Djibouti and remained there for over a century. On June 27, 1977, the last French colony on the African continent became independent. After 115 years of French colonialism, Côte Française des Somalis (French Somaliland), later known as the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas, became the sovereign Republic of Djibouti. Hassan Gouled Aptidon, the former leader of the African Popular League for Independence of Territoire Française des Afars et des Issas, became Djibouti's first President. Often portrayed as a "career" and "coffee house politician,"

<sup>4</sup>E. Hertslet, *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, 3d ed., vols. 1, 2, and 3 (London: His Majesty's Stationery House Office, 1909).

<sup>5</sup>For boundary details, see The Geographer, U.S. Department of State, *French Territory of Afars and Issas-Somalia Boundary*, no. 87 (Washington, D.C.: International Boundary Study, December 30, 1968), p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>Addressing the 25th Soviet Party Congress, Brezhnev observed the following: "... For it is quite clear that détente and peaceful coexistence are concerned with interstate relations. This means primarily that quarrels and conflicts between countries should not be decided by war, use of force or the threat of force. Détente does not in the slightest way abolish and cannot abolish or change the laws of class struggle ... In the developing countries, as everywhere, we are on the side of the forces of progress. ..." See *Pravda*, February 24, 1977, quoted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* vol. 25, no. 8 (March 24, 1977), pp. 3-32. Also see Daniel O. Graham, *The Crisis in Africa: U.S. Strategy at a Crossroads?* (Monograph in International Affairs, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976), pp. 8-9.

<sup>7</sup>China in recent years has also extended military assistance to Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Mali and Tanzania. See The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1976-1977.

the 61-year-old President is considered both "nationalist" and "anti-Communist."

### SINO-SOVIET INTERESTS

Changing political, military and economic patterns have always reflected the interests of major powers in the Horn. Today, Somalia and Ethiopia, territorial and political rivals, have formed alliances with the Soviet Union. Somalia and the People's Republic of China are also allied. The Republic of Djibouti, once a shabby relic of French colonialism, has concluded new cooperative cultural, economic and security agreements with France; its stability is dependent on the continuing presence of France.

Sino-Soviet policies in the Horn are presumably part of a larger plan for the African continent. First, and perhaps the most important, the Communist powers want to establish Communist rule in areas of strategic importance. Second, they utilize military, diplomatic and revolutionary forces to curtail the political predominance of the Western powers. Thus, in less than a decade, the major Communist bloc nations have appeared in the political arena of the Horn, replacing Western power in the region.

In Somalia, Ethiopia and other parts of Africa, the Soviet Union has acted with full vigor and contrary to the principles of "détente."<sup>6</sup> In contrast, the Chinese in Somalia and elsewhere have for the most part maintained a "low profile," busying themselves in rural and other economic projects.<sup>7</sup>

It may be helpful to recall that, despite Chinese access to the Pacific Ocean, China remained for decades a land power and showed little interest in naval power. The Soviet Union, whose lack of a warm sea front made her dependent on the outlets of the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea, also manifested relatively little concern for naval power. Today, although air power has modified the situation, both China and the Soviet Union attach great importance to sea power as an instrument of their quest for global hegemony. The competing ambitions of these nations in the Indian Ocean-Red Sea littoral states are indications of their growing desire to achieve strategic parity with the West, if not supremacy.

At present, Soviet military and economic aid is focused on Africa. Many African countries have received Soviet assistance and expect to receive more. The Soviet Union has supplied arms to Ethiopia, Somalia and elsewhere in Africa, but it has experienced serious setbacks in the Sudan, where Hashim el Atta's Communist-supported coup of 1971 was aborted by General Jaafar Numeiry. Numeiry subsequently moved away from the Soviet Union and sought political, economic and military alliances with the West and with moderate Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Nor has the Soviet Union forged a solid position in Aden, where China has wielded considerable influence since the British withdrawal from Yemen in 1967.

Since the military takeover on October 21, 1969, Somalia has received subsidies from the Soviet Union and China and from the European Economic Fund. In addition, in 1974, the governments of Abu Dhabi (an oil-producing Persian Gulf micro-state), Iraq and Libya among others began to finance Somalia's much needed irrigation and other economic projects.<sup>8</sup>

Recently, relations between Somalia and the Soviet Union, Somalia's principal ally, have deteriorated. In May, 1977, Mohammad Siad Barre, President of Somalia, termed Soviet military assistance to Ethiopia a danger to which his government had no intention to remain "indifferent." Earlier, Somalia opposed a Soviet proposal for an alliance of Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen and Djibouti. The Soviet proposal was transmitted to Barre by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro in Aden, during the African visit of Castro and Soviet President Nicolae Podgorny. The Somali rejection of this proposal, which was an attempt to reconcile the protracted hostility between Somali and Ethiopia, stemmed from Somalia's continuing territorial disputes with Ethiopia. In recent months, Somali-Ethiopian differences have intensified and violent clashes between the armed forces of Ethiopia and the Somali separatists have taken a heavy toll.<sup>9</sup>

In view of these developments, the power of the Soviet Union in Somalia would appear to be on the wane. President Barre's strong criticism of Soviet policy in Ethiopia was followed by his decision to lessen his country's dependence upon the Soviet Union. On July 13, 1977, Soviet military advisers were reported to have left Somalia in "large numbers." The withdrawal itself "coincided" with President Barre's return from Saudi Arabia, where he had negotiated for closer political and economic relations between the two states. Perhaps the tenets of Islam, to which the Somalis have adhered with a considerable degree of orthodoxy for almost 700 years, have drawn them closer to the Arab orbit. Somalia and Djibouti are members of the Arab League and regard themselves as Arab states. In fact, Arab countries have recently provided the Somali separatists (Somali Liberation Front) with economic and military aid.

Recent diplomatic efforts, reportedly arranged by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, seem to have opened the door for Somali cooperation with the West. The United States appears to have taken steps to assist Somalia. Such a development in Somalia, whose dependence on Soviet arms (including the training of her armed forces) exceeds that of any other country in Afri-

ca, may reflect Somali dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union and the changing world power balance.

Further, Soviet arms in the Eastern Horn and its immediate vicinity—a zone of Soviet dominance along the Red Sea-Indian Ocean—may not remain unchallenged by the Western community. The influence of the Western powers in northeastern Africa and their future role there are expected to deter Soviet advances in the Eastern Horn and to neutralize or match the strategic status of the Soviet Union in that area. Further, the Soviet support of Ethiopia and Somalia in their ever-widening conflict over Ogaden may not long endure. The Somali President may ultimately surrender to the drift away from the Soviet Union or disengage himself totally from Soviet dependence. In any case, the Soviet Union cannot long support both Somalia and Ethiopia at the same time and expect to win their allegiance.


Despite weakened local opportunities, the presence of the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa reflects intense Soviet interest in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In a Chinese news "commentary," the strategic objective of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Horn and in other parts of Africa was outlined as follows:

The Soviet Union has ... decided to concentrate its attack on Africa's rich strategic natural resources ... particularly because of its important strategic position ... In its ambitious scramble for world hegemony, the Soviet Union seeks to take over Africa for the purpose of cutting the sea-transport lanes, the life-lines, of West Europe and [the] United States. The Soviet expansionism into Africa is a "peripheral war" with the United States ... for domination in Europe.<sup>10</sup>

## ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA

In Ethiopia, the leftist military government faces intensified armed challenge by insurgent groups—irredentists in Eritrea and the Somalis in Ogaden; in the three years since the dissolution of the monarchy, Ethiopia has experienced upheavals more serious than any in recent history.

Agricultural and ruggedly mountainous Ethiopia (approximately 457,142 square miles) is bounded on the north (through her northern province, Eritrea) by the Red Sea, on the west by the Sudan, on the east by Djibouti, on the south by Kenya and on the south-



east by Somalia. The Eritrean coast stretches from the southeastern corner of the Sudan, where Massawa, the most important port, was the chief gateway to Italy's former East African empire. In late August, 1977, the port of Massawa was encircled by Eritrean separatists, who also captured the strategically important town of

<sup>8</sup>*Africa Diary*, December 24-31, 1974, p. 7249.

<sup>9</sup>*Facts on File*, June 4, 1977, p. 428. Also see *The Washington Post*, July 16, 1977, p. A13.

<sup>10</sup>"Soviet Expansion to Africa Doomed to Failure" (NCNA-English, Peking, April 29, 1977); U.S. Department of Commerce: National Technical Information Services, *Survey of People's Republic of China Press* (May, 1977), pp. 241-42.

Mandafara and dealt heavy blows to government forces in the surrounding areas.

During the Italian conquest in East Africa between the two World Wars, Eritrea was the base of operation. Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935 and ultimately established Africa Orientale Italiana. Italian East Africa included Italian Somaliland, Ogaden, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Italy's occupation of Ethiopia and her adjacent lands lasted until 1941, when Italy was defeated by the British, who installed a military administration that governed the former Italian colonies until 1950.

In accord with the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, Italy lost her empire in Africa and elsewhere; Italy's former colonies in East Africa were placed under the joint authority of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain. Unable to agree on the future of these territories, these states asked the United Nations to solve the problem. In 1950, a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly proposed a federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In 1962, Ethiopia received a favorable vote from the Eritrean National Assembly and annexed Eritrea.

The bonds of common interest and purpose that were expected to develop between Eritrea and Ethiopia soon began to show signs of increasing strain. In 1961, a group of Eritreans, who allegedly received support from the exiled revolutionaries in Egypt, began an armed campaign for the independence of Eritrea. Today, the irredentist movement, whose goal is to establish an independent socialist state in Eritrea, apparently has the support of the Muslim as well as the Christian community in the region. The split between the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Eritrean National Liberation Front, which has dominated the armed movement for the past 16 years, exacerbates demands for national independence. The split apparently does not reflect the ideological differences between Islam and Marxism, but is based on other factors (e.g., personalities). So far, the Eritrean separatists have conducted highly disciplined guerrilla warfare against Ethiopia's Soviet-Cuban trained peasant army. In spite of heavy Eritrean losses (some 30,000 are estimated to have lost their lives and about 900,000 have been displaced), the nature and suitability of the terrain have minimized the possibility that the Eritreans will be defeated by the Ethiopian army.<sup>11</sup>

Eritrean attempts to achieve independence are also based on cultural factors. Eritreans argue that the fed-

eration of Eritrea with Ethiopia was accomplished without their consent. Moreover, they maintain that the people of Eritrea have developed social and cultural institutions different from those in Ethiopia. Thus, they regard armed struggle as the sole means of preserving their cultural identity.

Historically, Eritrea has always been a paradox. In the words of Brigadier Stephen Longrigg, Chief British Administrator of Eritrea (1942-1944):

It belongs neither to the north, nor to central Africa, nor typically to the east. It is not of the Nile Valley, nor mainly of the Red Sea. Its countryside is partly of Ethiopian type, partly Sudan—and the same is true of its inhabitants. It has had its place in the policies of Turkey and of Egypt, of Ethiopia and of Italy.<sup>12</sup>

Culturally heterogeneous, both Ethiopians and Eritreans are strongly influenced by Semitic and Hamitic elements that penetrated the Nile Valley and the Red Sea coast some thousand years before Christ. Adventurous and ambitious, the earlier Semitic settlers who succeeded the Hamites came to the East African highlands from Saba (also known as Sheba) kingdom. Later, they intermixed with indigenous people and established the tribal structures of Habashe (Ethiopia), Shoa Galla and Amhara, among others. In time, the powerful kingdoms of Axum and of Tigre in today's Eritrea were founded. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, linguistic patterns reflecting Judeo-Arab and Greek influences were introduced. Thereafter, the Amharic language was adopted by orthodox Ethiopians, and Tigrinia became the spoken language of the Muslims as well as the Christian Eritreans.<sup>13</sup>

## ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA

The British Somaliland Protectorate became independent on June 25, 1960, and five days later merged with the Trust Territory of Somaliland (formerly Italian Somaliland) and became the Republic of Somalia.

The present 994-mile boundary between Ethiopia and Somalia meanders northeastward from the Kenya tripoint to latitude 5° north and follows it to the Webi Shebelli. The boundary crosses this river and runs northeastward for some 509 miles as the provisional-administrative boundary toward latitude 8° north, which it intersects at either 47° or 48° east, giving rise to the unending dispute over Ogaden. Turning northeastward along the limits of Haud, the boundary reaches the Djibouti tripoint.<sup>14</sup>

After independence, Somalia claimed not only the Ogaden as part of Greater Somaliland, but also the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the former Territory of the Afars and the Issas (now Djibouti).

The Ogaden is a semi-desert expanse almost half the size of Somalia. Allegedly inhabited by Somalis, it has been most affected by Somali incursion. Kenya and Djibouti also have been the scene of armed conflicts with Somalia recently. In early June, insurgents des-

<sup>11</sup>For an excellent three-part series on the current situation in Eritrea, see John Darnton, *The New York Times*, July 11, 12 and 13, 1977.

<sup>12</sup>Stephen H. Longrigg, *A Short History of Eritrea* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1974), p. 1.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 10-17.

<sup>14</sup>The Geographer, U.S. Department of State, *Ethiopia-Somalia Boundary*, no. 153 (Washington, D.C.: International Boundary Study, November 5, 1975), p. 1.



troyed bridges linking the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway at Diredawa and other points in Ethiopia, disrupting the country's access to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Intermittently, clashes have also continued between Somalia and Kenya.

Somalia, however, claims that she is not involved in the separatist campaign of Ethiopia's Ogaden. She regards the campaign as a "nationalist movement" by the Somali in Ogaden who share a common culture and language with Somalia. Somali claims to adjacent territories are rooted in Somalia's claim that the boundaries established by colonial powers have artificially separated the Somali from their true homeland. In the words of former Somali Prime Minister and President Abd el-Rashid Ali Shirmarke (assassinated on October 15, 1969),

our neighboring countries with whom, like the rest of Africa, we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations, are not our neighbors. Our neighbors are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary arrangements.

Rashid pointed out also that the Somali in neighboring regions

have to move across artificial frontiers to their pasturelands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same pastoral economy as ourselves. We speak the same language. We share the same creed, the same culture, and the same tradition. How can we regard our brothers as foreigners? Of course we have a strong and very natural desire to be united.<sup>15</sup>

The Somali penetration of Ogaden began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the ethnic groups of Dire, Darod and Issas settled in the northern regions of what is now Somalia. In the late nineteenth century, under Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia, Ogaden was occupied as part of Ethiopia. Thus the assertion that Ogaden belonged to the "ancient Ethiopian Empire" is generally held to be without foundation. In 1897 and 1908, however, the region attained "some status in international law."<sup>16</sup> Article IV of the Ethiopian-Italian Protocol of May 16, 1908, provided that

... following the line accepted by the Italian Government in 1897 ... all the territories of Ogaden, and all that of tribes of Ogaden shall remain dependent on Abyssinia.

In spite of protests from Ethiopia, during the British occupation of the Italian East African Empire from

1942 to 1948 Ogaden united with Somalia. In 1948, the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty established the Provisional Administration Line to be "without prejudice" as the boundary "between Somalia and the former Italian Somaliland."<sup>17</sup> Since then, the desire to unite the Somali in Ogaden with the Somali in Somalia has hardly been quiescent.

Currently, the armed conflict between the Somali insurgents in Ogaden and Ethiopian armed forces has drawn Ethiopia and Somalia into an open confrontation. Somali President Barre accuses Ethiopia of preparing for the invasion of Somalia, while Ethiopia charges Somalia with direct participation in the Ogaden insurgency. Ethiopia claims that Somalia intends to force her to dispatch army units throughout the area to "facilitate" an all-out confrontation with the Somalis. The Somali government is apparently also apprehensive of the role Cuba may play in Somalia's conflict with Ethiopia. Cuban military advisers in Ethiopia serve to remind the Somali that the Angolan experience may repeat itself in the Horn of Africa, drawing outside powers to the arena of conflict. In the event of direct confrontation between the two feuding countries, Somalia cautions that "what was an African war will change into an international conflict," presumably fearing that the United States and the Soviet Union will become directly involved in the African Horn.<sup>18</sup>

The Somali army, navy, and air force, with a combined manpower of 23,000, is thought to be far better organized than Ethiopia's 49,000-man military force, recently reinforced by an estimated 100,000-man peasant army. Somalia also maintains a 6,000-man paramilitary force as border guards and the people's militia, while Ethiopia has a total of 19,200 in territorial, police, frontier and commando forces. With a gross national product of \$2.24 billion in 1974 (estimated to have increased by over \$500 million in 1976), Ethiopia's defense expenditure for 1973 was approximately \$84 million. Somalia, whose gross national product increased from \$236 million in 1974 to \$264 million in 1976, spent \$15 million on defense during 1976. Defense production in both Ethiopia and Somalia is zero, and both countries maintain that their military arsenals are provided by the Soviet Union. In 1976, Somalia's defense included some 250 tanks, 350 APC's, numerous artillery, two submarine chasers, ten patrol boats, and a few other ships. Her air force totaled six squadrons of planes and helicopters, which included 79 MiG's, among others.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, in 1976 Ethiopia possessed 62 tanks, 56 armored cars, 50 APC's, 100 howitzers, 146 mortars and 6 Bell UH-1's. Her naval defense included one minesweeper, nine coastal boats and a training ship, and a few naval aircraft. Her Air Force inventory included three squadrons of light fighter bombers as well as reconnaissance and transport planes. In addition, Ethiopia maintained some 30 helicopters and trainer fleets.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup>I. M. Lewis, *The Modern History of Somaliland* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 179.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 216.

<sup>17</sup>"Ethiopia-Somali Boundary," *op. cit.*, pp. 4-6.

<sup>18</sup>*Washington Post*, July 30, 1977; also see *U.S. News and World Report*, August 29, 1977, pp. 43-44.

<sup>19</sup>*Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook*, 1976-1977, p. 410.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 135.

Under Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, the United States remained for decades Ethiopia's closest ally; hence the two countries maintained military and security agreements. However, after the fall of the monarchy, Ethiopia's military governments became increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for military assistance. On April 23, 1977, Ethiopia ordered the closing of the United States, British, French, Belgian, Italian and Sudanese consulates in Asmara, the capital of Eritrea. This action and violation of human rights in Ethiopia restricted United States-Ethiopian military and economic relations.

### ETHIOPIA'S POLITICAL HISTORY

Ethiopia's lack of progress has been attributed to the failure of her monarchs to adjust to a changing world. Thus the oldest independent state in Africa remained for centuries a backwater in a state of economic and political retardation, where only a few gained access to wealth. All land was divided equally among the monarch, the nobility and the church, each possessing one-third.

In recent years, Ethiopia became the scene of political and economic turmoil. Rebellion in Eritrea, widespread famine, drought and resulting social unrest hastened the demise of the Ethiopian monarchy under Haile Selassie I (formerly Ras Tefari); which was abolished by the provisional military government on March 21, 1975.

Ethiopia's army mutiny began as a minor insurrection at Negelle in Borana (a southern province), where an incipient radical cell had been established. A decisive undercurrent, the rebellion had been organized by a group of young army officers who maintained membership in a highly secret and anonymous organization, known as Dergue, or Committee.<sup>21</sup>

In the wake of the army mutiny of February, 1974, the government of Akilu Habte-Wolde was forced to resign. The new moderate Prime Minister, Lij Endelkatchew Makonnen, formed a Cabinet and designated a committee to review and revise the constitution. However, his short-lived administration (which lasted from February 28, 1974, to July of that same year), did not accomplish its desired objective. Both Prime Ministers, Habte-Wolde and Makonnen, were subsequently executed by the provisional military government for the "abuse of authority."<sup>22</sup>

Subsequent post-rebellion governments, including those headed by Michael Imru, an Oxford-educated member of high nobility, and Lieutenant General Aman Michael Andom, an Eritrean who had formed the provisional military government, began the fruitless task

of merging old and new institutions. Both these governments inherited a deteriorating economy aggravated by a persistent drought. Despite the continued flow of subsidies from the United States (which contributed most) and elsewhere, the absence of a well-planned economic program plus factionalism and general political instability complicated their task. Later, in 1974, Dergue forced Andom to resign. He had refused to agree to its demands for the execution of former high-ranking government officials without due process of law, the reinforcement of troops on the Eritrean front, and the ratification of legal framework providing for arrests and the confiscation of property. On November 22, 1974, Dergue implicated Andom in an attempted coup and charged him with several counts of treasonable acts. He, too, was shot to death in his residence by the arresting officers.<sup>23</sup>

On November 23, 1974, Dergue dealt the heaviest blow yet to the establishment in a massive purge that came to be known as "bloody Saturday." The purge included the execution of high-ranking government officials, senior army officers and others in the imperial guard who were said to have been found "guilty" of "gross abuse of authority" and "involvement in a plot to incite civil war and disrupt Ethiopia's popular movement." On November 27, Brigadier-General Tefari Banti, of Shoa descent, who had served in various capacities in the Ethiopian army, and Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, a Wollomo (southwestern Ethiopian) assumed control of the Provisional Military Council, as Chairman and Vice Chairman, respectively. Less than a month later, on December 2, Dergue announced its intentions to introduce a one-party system in Ethiopia and began to formulate policies for the state ownership of the means of production, including the creation of a "socialist state." On July 14, 1975, the government established the Ethiopian Socialist party, which included workers, the army, and other sectors of the country.<sup>24</sup>

On February 3, 1977, Tefari Banti, the Chairman of the Provisional Military Council and the Chief of State, and a number of his supporters were executed by members of Dergue in a pre-dawn coup. Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam "emerged" victorious. The main reason for the latest bloody coup was factionalism and the power struggle among Dergue leaders, who had no sense of mutual confidence. Among the casualties in the palace battle was Captain Alemayehu Haili, Secretary-General of Dergue, who was accused of an alliance with the ultra-leftist Ethiopian People's

(Continued on page 225)

<sup>21</sup>See *Africa Contemporary Record* (ACR), vol. 7, 1974-1975, p. B160.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, p. B184.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, p. B186.

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*"The configuration of the area known as East Africa has begun to change. Hostilities have replaced earlier harmony and have shattered hopes for cooperation; and the states in the area are looking outside for economic and political ties, some of which may prove to be durable."*

## Whither East Africa?

BY W. A. E. SKURNIK

*Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado*

THE East African Community, once a promising venture in African regional cooperation, has all but collapsed. Unfortunately, post-independence African attempts to enlarge or maintain structures for inter-African cooperation have not been very successful, particularly when partners of unequal wealth are involved. The East African Community (EAC) is only one example of this trend, which has led to the continuing balkanization of Africa by Africans.

The EAC was founded in late 1967 to strengthen economic ties and promote economic growth among the three member states—Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. A common market was conceived as an instrument of regional development, and the EAC also incorporated the Common Services Organization, a heritage from British rule. Its services included four jointly operated "self-supporting" common corporations—for railroads, harbors, airways and telecommunications—plus some 20 specialized services from civil aviation to virus research, supported by a general fund. Although the EAC managed to survive—or hobble along—from crisis to crisis in the past few years, it never achieved significant integration and was all but moribund by 1977.

The EAC was patterned on earlier attempts to base interstate African cooperation on colonial ties. Colonial, pre-independence structures deferred to an outside arbiter and operated without the pressures generated by nationalism in sovereign African states. Although carefully supervised inter-African cooperation was designed in part to serve African interests, priorities were essentially those of the colonial power. Once the new states had achieved political independence, differences among the partners surfaced and grew.

In the case of the EAC, significant underlying tensions grew in intensity over the years. First, the EAC was not a true supranational organization; it was, rather, a coordinating agency subject to the effective veto of the member states and dependent on their continued commitment to common objectives. Differing sociopolitical structures in each state acted as irritants. Kenya, for example, favored a system with ample room

for foreign and domestic development capital, which produced economic elites to which her political leaders were responsive. Some of these elites did not want to operate for the benefit of poorer neighboring countries and cultivated prominent domestic political leaders who were willing to articulate their negative position toward the EAC. In Tanzania, public support for the Community was neither widespread nor based on powerful subsidiary elites. In Uganda under Idi Amin, primary and secondary elite support for the EAC was virtually nonexistent; support for the EAC was confined to a few people at the top, whose dedication was more pragmatic than enthusiastic and was weakened by their lack of expertise and their need to subordinate their support to Amin's highly authoritarian, unpredictable and personalized administration. Tanzanians disapproved and openly criticized Kenya's prosperity and Western connections; Kenyans tended to scoff at Tanzania's "hypocrisy" for embracing a hollow socialism and "self-reliance" while living on international handouts. The different objectives of the three states were thus magnified and acquired ideological overtones, reminiscent of the dissension between the elites of Senegal and Mali shortly before the breakup of the Mali Federation in 1960.

A second underlying tension was economic. Originally, each of the three states regarded the Community as an instrument for the improvement of their nation's welfare. But because of profound differences, the governing elites' aims for the Community were not in harmony.

As the richest partner, Kenya saw opportunities for market expansion, although she did not want to lose investments or to dilute trade to Community partners, or to alter a domestic economic system that seemed reasonably adequate, or to bear excessive burdens for the benefit of foreigners. As the poorest of the three, Tanzania could afford to experiment with fundamental alterations in her social and economic structures. Moreover, her President, Julius K. Nyerere, has a profound ideological commitment to the ideal of African unity. He saw the EAC as a road to unity and was willing

to join, even though concrete returns for Tanzania did not seem immediately attractive.

One reason for the eventual breakup of the Community was the difference between Kenyan and Tanzanian expectations. Tanzania argued that common services should be integrated with the common market and that long-range economic planning for development for a regional market should rest on the long-range needs of all partners. Kenya disagreed, and emphasized short-term needs. Since 1972, furthermore, Uganda seemed unable to participate meaningfully in the planning process.

A third underlying tension concerned the nature of domestic African society and its evolution. Tanzania and Uganda (under President Milton Obote) tried to use the EAC to change the domestic status quo, whereas Kenya sought to use the Community to maintain its status quo. Once Amin took over power in Uganda in 1971, that country's objectives changed to something less coherent, and Tanzania's decision to support the exiled Obote in his attempts to regain control of Uganda became an added political irritant.

There was also ideological tension. This involved concepts about desirable social, economic and political domestic structures and found expression in a conflict between "socialism" and "capitalism." The ideological component of these values took on a life of its own, reinforced concrete differences and impeded cooperation. While Obote was one of the partners, there was a preponderance of "socialist" ideological commitment; but after Amin came to power in Uganda in 1971, Tanzania stood alone in that conviction, and the dissimilarities among the partners became increasingly prominent.

The immediate cause of the EAC's apparent demise involved the common services. The world recession and soaring petroleum prices aggravated an already critical situation. Foreign exchange earnings were carefully husbanded, and the three states were hard pressed to extract contributions to the EAC from their national budgets. The four corporations, plagued by poor management, lack of consultation, and sizable deficits, depend on these contributions. The malaise of East African Airways (EAA) was the occasion for drastic action: outstanding debts, shouldered by Kenya, exceeded \$15 million by January, 1977; thus Kenya stopped subsidizing uneconomic flights inside Tanzania and Uganda and asked for an immediate transfer of funds to cover operating expenses. Both Tanzania and Uganda reacted sharply, Uganda attributing the move to Israeli influence and Tanzania to Kenyan profiteers. Verbal escalation in Tanzania was particularly swift and strong. Shortly afterward, Kenya decided not to carry the heavy financial burden of EAA any longer and to follow Uganda by creating a national airline company with British backing to serve her domestic needs and the lucrative flights to Europe and Asia.

Tanzania retaliated by closing her 450-mile border with Kenya and confiscating Kenyan and British property. The move was designed to hurt Kenya's economy and perhaps to encourage unrest that would lead to a change of government in Kenya. The economic consequences for Kenya were serious but not crippling. The border closure deprived her of the Tanzanian export market but it did not interfere with the greater volume of trade with Uganda. However, Tanzania's move impeded indirect trade with Zambia and future business opportunity.

In the wake of the dislocations associated with the EAC, both Tanzania and Kenya realigned their regional foreign relations. Kenya, in particular, was concerned about the cumulative effect of her growing isolation and consequently looked for new economic and political ties. Relations with Uganda since Amin took power had been especially tense. Incidents like Amin's claim to Kenyan territory, however seriously intended, and his attempt to truck Soviet weapons from Mombasa without prior clearance from Nairobi, strained ties further. The mediation efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were not successful. Uganda and Tanzania were hostile; relations with Ethiopia were deteriorating; and, Nairobi was increasingly sensitive about armed incursions by Somalia, which covets Kenyan territory. Tanzania's decision to close her border with Kenya was seen as a deliberate effort to destabilize the government of Kenya by encouraging domestic political dissent and by damaging her economy. Subsequently, Kenya's leaders made overtures toward Arab states, especially toward the Sudan, in part because that country was moving away from Soviet friendship and closer to the West. Initial contacts were formalized at the March, 1977, Afro-Arab meeting in Cairo and were followed by economic agreements. The objectives of the new policy included access to markets and capital and Arab diplomatic support against Somali irredentism. A cooling trend toward Israel can be expected as a quid pro quo. Kenya also began to strengthen and modernize her armed forces, the weakest in the area.

## TANZANIA'S PROGRESS

Tanzania took stock of domestic progress toward the new era of socialism ushered in 10 years ago by the Arusha Declaration (1967), and carried out some important domestic political changes. In 1977, the government issued a realistic assessment of its progress in a document that reviewed many achievements (like welfare services) and shortcomings (particularly in agriculture and management). It concluded that socialism, at first predicted for the end of this century, was "not even in sight." President Julius Nyerere's inspired and widely admired leadership has not yet overcome the tedious and tenacious challenges inherent in transform-



ing Tanzanian society, which he has characterized as "neither democratic nor socialist."

In order to reinforce the unity of the United Republic of Tanzania (and Zanzibar), a number of significant domestic political changes accompanied the overall reassessment of national objectives. These concerned political parties, the legislature, and the executive. The most important change was the merger of the separate parties of Tanzania (Tanzania National Union—TANU) and Zanzibar (Afro-Shirazi Party—ASP) into a single party, the Chama cha Mapinduzi (meaning "revolutionary party"). This party was inaugurated on Zanzibar in February, 1977; Nyerere became its president, and the former president of the ASP, Nyerere's close friend Aboud Jumbe, was installed as its vice president. A new Tanzanian constitution was also adopted, providing for the election, rather than the appointment, of Zanzibari representatives to serve with 96 Tanzanians in the common legislature. Separate executive structures were retained in Zanzibar and Tanzania to reflect the diversity and quasi-federal character of the United Republic, but it was expected that the single party would foster greater cohesion, at least at the national level. Nyerere remained President of the Republic, but Tanzania's Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa, a close and long-time Nyerere associate, was replaced by the energetic Defense Minister, Edward Sokoine. Moreover, Benjamin Mkapa became the new Foreign Minister, replacing Ibrahim Kaduma.

In foreign relations, Tanzania went south, toward closer ties with Mozambique and an eventually independent Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). The realignment was foreshadowed and facilitated by a number of developments in southern Africa and by Mwalimu Nyerere's active opposition to continued white minority rule. First, the longtime personal friendship between Nyerere and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia was reinforced by the "tazara" railroad, which links the Zambian copper belt with a Tanzanian port, and by their collaboration in southern African liberation movements.

Second, the diplomatic, ideological and military support given by Tanzania to FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) and subsequently to independent Mozambique holds out hopes for future close cooperation, at least in the short run. Mozambique's first diplomatic mission accredited to an individual state was sent to Dar es Salaam, headed by no less a dignitary than a member of the FRELIMO Central Committee, Che F. C. Lukanga. Several economic agreements with Mozambique testify to a desire for closer ties.

A third factor favoring relations with states other than Kenya and Uganda is the informal group of "front line" states (including Tanzania as its acknowledged leader, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Angola), which provides a nucleus for diplomatic activity and has considerable influence on developments in southern

Africa. Finally, Nyerere's relations with leaders of freedom fighter groups in Rhodesia are intended in part to prepare for future cooperation.

There is some indication that Tanzania's present policy continues to place a high premium on ideology. Her refusal to respond to Kenya's conciliatory overtures about the EAC, her use of economic pressure to help change Kenya's political regime, her continued support for Obote, and her close relations with Mozambique suggest the importance of ideology in Tanzania's foreign relations. Her ideological dedication was also manifest in calls for sacrifice and vigilance and her fear of contamination by capitalism—reportedly including Kenyan consumer goods. Overtures toward Uganda, in July, 1977, to keep a rump EAC going may seem paradoxical in the light of Nyerere's abhorrence of Amin, but might pave the road for Obote's eventual return and Tanzania's subsequent collaboration with a presumably grateful neighbor. African leaders are known for sudden reconciliation; but the possibility that current elites will resume meaningful and harmonious cooperation nevertheless seems dim.

In Africa, ideology frequently tends to yield to more practical and secular aspects of the national interest in jealously independent new states. Moreover, ideological compatibility frequently generates its own tensions, aside from national interest considerations. The more important the ideology, the greater the pressures for orthodoxy and doctrinal purity, which in turn breed dissent. If previous experience in Africa is any guide, a combination of ideological and personal bases for regional cooperation may be frittered away by disputes about the purity and legitimate interpreter of the true faith.

## AMIN'S UGANDA

The dynamics of the Amin regime, as they appear through a veil of heavy censorship, involve attempts to neutralize domestic opposition by means of terror and violence and to silence external opposition by means of personal diplomacy, pragmatic and shifting alignments, and unorthodox statements and behavior. The country is in a state of suspended animation: the government has exploited the specter of foreign intervention to maintain law, if not order, and to elicit tacit African support partly by means of Amin's showmanship and manipulation of anti-colonial symbols.

As of August, 1977, at least four unsuccessful attempts to overthrow Amin had been mounted by small groups of exiles from neighboring countries and by domestic dissidents. The government not only blamed various countries and leaders—Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, Israel, the United States—but arrested and executed a number of prominent Ugandans and tens of thousands of citizens regarded as dangerous—chiefly members of dissident ethnic groups, like the Longi and Acholi, and Christians. After the third attempted coup,

Amin used the 240 Americans living in Uganda to pressure the United States government to moderate its criticism and to demonstrate to the world that foreign nationals are generally not mistreated in Uganda. The United States government, no doubt aware of Amin's unpredictability, enlisted the help of several third world states which persuaded Amin to cancel a planned public show and to repeal his order that Americans could not leave the country. In response to a United States government initiative to have the United Nations investigate reported mass killings in Uganda, Amin sent a public message to Washington, D.C., suggesting an investigation of American violations of human rights.<sup>1</sup>

Amin's power rests on a number of bases. He is supported by the officers of the armed forces, who benefit from lavish appropriations and privileges and share political power. In addition, he draws support from several small ethnic groups, including his own Kakwa, which now provide the backbone of the armed forces. Groups recruited from neighboring countries, including former Anyanya freedom fighters from the southern Sudan and Palestinians, also back Amin. These foreign elements make up the bulk of the four "elimination" units—the State Research Bureau, the Public Safety Unit, the Clearance Squad, and the Military Police—under Amin's direct control, which are widely credited with most of the terror visited on the country. Finally, Amin's personality is charismatic; he projects the role of a traditional African chief using his authority to the full and tolerating no dissent. Such a power base is inherently fragile. Growing numbers of Ugandan exile groups, mostly in the West, may be instrumental, in collaboration with domestic dissidents, in changing the regime.

External sources of opposition include Obote and his followers in Tanzania, Ugandan exiles on three continents, African states and international organizations. Obote has been active but must move carefully, because he depends on Tanzanian support and because Dar es Salaam is not keen on military hostilities. Other exiles are apparently uncoordinated and suffer all the handicaps of geographic distance. African states and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have not taken any significant initiatives, relying on verbal condemnation.

The OAU has a profound commitment to the tenacious and indiscriminate principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of member states. This reflects the fragile nature of Africa's political systems. Investigation of one country by an international body could be destabilizing and might bring more turmoil to the African continent. The OAU message is "hands off"; as a

result, the mass killings in Uganda are ignored on the principle of nonintervention, itself based on fears of generalized unrest.

The OAU also gives priority to the liberation of the continent from colonialism and alien minority rule; in line with that purpose Africa has internationalized the southern African issue. Other concerns, like human rights, are genuine but have no priority. The new OAU chairman, President Albert Bongo of Gabon, explained that, whereas racism is a pressing international issue, "justice" is domestic and is therefore "not our business." African resolve is also influenced by pride: whatever else Amin is, he is a symbol of African virility. Finally, because of the magnitude of the problems faced by African states, their capacity to influence events in Uganda is limited.

International organizations have given Amin's domestic excesses wide publicity but have been ineffective in bringing about change. The International Commission of Jurists, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, and Amnesty International have concluded that Amin's regime is responsible for up to 300,000 deaths. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, a reflection of the General Assembly dominated by African and Asian delegations—of which Uganda is a member—decided against an investigation. Only five African states—Uganda excluded—have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; this is perhaps an indication of African priorities.

The June, 1977, Commonwealth meeting, attended by 13 African heads of state, issued a statement condemning Amin for "sustained disregard for human life and massive violation of basic human rights." But the OAU summit meeting at Libreville, Gabon, later that month chose to ignore the issue officially. A few individual states have used diplomacy to communicate their disapproval of Amin: the United States (December, 1973) and Ghana (May, 1977) withdrew their missions from Kampala, and Britain has broken relations. A few African states have expressed public disapproval. Kenya, for instance, has said that "independent Africa is in danger of losing, by default, any right [to attack] . . . Rhodesia and South Africa over issues which pale into insignificance when compared with the widespread killings in Uganda."<sup>2</sup> The effect of these measures was negligible.

(Continued on page 226)

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<sup>1</sup>The text of the message was printed in *The New York Times*, February 26, 1977.

<sup>2</sup>Editorial in the Kenyan government newspaper *Daily Nation*, February 22, 1977.

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*"The fate of white South Africa depends more on her political and diplomatic skills, coupled with economic inducements, than on her military hardware."*

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# South Africa and Namibia

BY RICHARD DALE

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A cardinal tenet of the theory of separate development (or apartheid, to use the Afrikaans phrase) is that history and the gospel demonstrate that each group of persons in South Africa has a distinct status, mission in life, perceived identity and natural homeland. The theory, which has its critics both inside and outside the charmed circle of Afrikaners (those white South Africans whose mother language is Afrikaans), would be a plaything of intellectuals, theological students, sociologists and cultural anthropologists had it not been sanctified and legitimized in the general election of 1948, when the National party of Daniel F. Malan, a former clergyman of the Dutch Reformed Church, was ushered into power. For almost three decades, the National party has won general election after general election and has gathered unto itself the instruments of state power. It is this political party, which bears some slight resemblance to political parties of the Fourth French Republic because of its proclivity to theorize and cerebrate about the nature of the body politic, which imprints its worldview on its own followers and its subjects.<sup>1</sup>

In its worldview, distinctions are crucial. Who allocates what to whom on what basis? It is the process of allocation that sets South Africa apart from most polities in the world. The white group has arrogated to it-

<sup>1</sup>For a thoughtful appraisal of the world of the Afrikaner, see T. Dunbar Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

<sup>2</sup>The mechanisms and rationales of apartheid are explored in Pierre L. van den Berghe, *South Africa: A Study in Conflict* (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1965).

<sup>3</sup>A very basic work in this field is Gwendolen M. Carter, Thomas G. Karis, and Newell M. Stultz, *South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967). Recent developments are accurately related in Muriel Horrell et al. (compilers), *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1976* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1977), pp. 228-246.

<sup>4</sup>See Roger J. Southall, "The Beneficiaries of Transkeian 'Independence,'" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1 (March, 1977), pp. 1-23 and David Thomas, "Transkei Booms As Its Creator Grooms," *The Star* (Johannesburg), international airmail weekly edition, August 20, 1977, p. 13 (hereafter cited as *The Star* [airmail] with the date).

self the right to allocate, while the non-whites (many of whom now prefer to describe themselves as black in order to bridge the differences among Africans, Asians and those of mixed descent) are expected to content themselves with the relatively passive role of beneficiaries. For the whites, the donor-recipient relationship is the time-tested way to insure continued white domination, a relationship often euphemistically described as white leadership, or the defense of Western (and Christian) civilization. Such semantics are necessary not only to justify the superior-subordinate relationship to the bemused and hostile outside world but also to give the whites a sense of rectitude. Rudyard Kipling's "white man's burden" could well serve as the operational code of the Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking whites, with few exceptions.<sup>2</sup>

After the distinction between white and non-white in the doctrine and practice of apartheid, perhaps second most important is the distinction between the rural and the urban African. In the taxonomy of apartheid, an urban-dwelling African is one who is absent with permission from his rural ethnic base. Such an African has been removed from his natural milieu and lives on the geographical rim of the white cities solely to contribute to the national economy.

The natural locale of the African, in apartheid doctrine, is with his ethnic kith and kin in areas once simply called "native reserves," which have been elevated to the level of "homelands" in the South African political lexicon. In October, 1976, the Transkei, which is the homeland allocated to Xhosa-speakers, received its independence from the South African metropole.<sup>3</sup> The Transkei has all the outward and visible symbols of sovereignty. Yet it shares a pariah status with Rhodesia because of its diplomatic isolation; it has yet to be diplomatically recognized by any nation in the world except the Republic of South Africa, which is its principal financial supporter.

Although it lacks diplomatic recognition and is not likely to secure it in the near future, the Transkei provides a small enclave with direct access to the Indian Ocean for a select number of Xhosa-speakers so that they may exercise their talents and gain surcease from those practices of apartheid that are so offensive to blacks in South Africa.<sup>4</sup> For some blacks, the Transkei

may provide what has been felicitously termed "soulware"<sup>5</sup> in a manner possibly reminiscent of the Garvey movement back to Africa or of the exodus of American freedmen to Liberia in the nineteenth century.<sup>6</sup> However, neither its public nor its private economic sectors are so well developed that they can support more than a small proportion of all Xhosa-speakers resident in South Africa. The Pretoria and Umtata (the capital cities of South Africa and the Transkei, respectively) governments are at loggerheads regarding who belongs to what polity, with the Umtata authorities resisting the notion that all African Xhosa-speakers within the boundaries of the Republic of South Africa are de jure citizens of the Transkei and hence ineligible for dual nationality. The feelings of Xhosa ethnicity are imputed to all Xhosas both inside the Transkei and outside in the South African diaspora, irrespective of whether the Xhosa-speakers feel such an affinity. To accept Transkeian citizenship is to accept a foreign nationality equivalent to that of neighboring Mozambique, Lesotho or Botswana; it also implies acceptance of the doctrine of the territorial fragmentation of South Africa along racial and linguistic lines.<sup>7</sup> Extreme tension can arise when the South African authorities declare that certain Xhosas are economically redundant in a white-controlled area and hence are the responsibility of the Transkei, a notion that the Transkeian officials do not accept meekly.<sup>8</sup>

In early December, 1977, a second homeland, known as Bophuthatswana, is expected to be granted sovereign independence by the Pretoria government. This particular homeland lacks both an outlet to the sea and a consolidated land mass—two assets which the Transkei enjoys—and is the ethnic enclave of those Africans who speak Setswana and who are still South African nationals. The other major group of Batswana are located in the neighboring Republic of Botswana, a

Commonwealth member that has been independent since 1966. The political leadership of Bophuthatswana, like that of the Transkei, is faced with the citizenship issue and with a relative paucity of economic resources.<sup>9</sup> Both homelands have had only limited success in attracting foreign and South African private investments. Under the administration of Hendrik Verwoerd, white South African businessmen were proscribed from direct investment in the reserves-turned-homelands, and limited amounts of capital were channeled through a public corporation known as the Bantu Investment Corporation. There has been a change of official policy regarding such investment and the corporation has been given a new name, the Corporation for Economic Development.<sup>10</sup> However, since that corporation was first formed in 1959, there has been a growing international hostility to the policy of apartheid and a noticeable campaign in Western nations to force disinvestment in South Africa. This campaign is directed at multinational corporations (in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany) that have South African subsidiaries. Such a campaign has met with favor among certain Western church groups and has stirred controversy on university campuses in the West.<sup>11</sup>

#### URBAN AFRICANS

Almost 30 years ago, a Jan Smuts government-appointed commission (the Fagan Commission) took stock of the Africans' position in the Union of South Africa in the wake of World War II. The Fagan Commission made it clear that the rustic and ethnically parochial African—the one the Western tourist expects to see, which depicts African reality about as poorly as the traditional cigar store Indian in America reflects the indigenous American—was fast becoming an anthropological relic. Rapid industrialization, especially to supply the needs of the South African Defense Forces and the Allied Powers in World War II, had a catalytic effect on the migration of rural Africans to urban areas. Such rural-to-urban migrations, with the attendant shantytowns and physical and moral squalor, were not unique to South Africa and have been observed by students of Latin American, Asian, and African affairs. Urban blight did not preclude the feeling of community among Africans from different ethnic roots; it facilitated the growth of Western styles of life, education and dress, and a growing political consciousness. The African townships around cities like Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg and the economic growth points in the gold-rich Witwatersrand area in the Transvaal became schools for African political awareness, for African writers in search of their own style and idiom in journalism and fiction. In turn, the townships gave rise to a whole new generation who knew no other roots. The South West Townships of Johannesburg, collectively known by the acronym of Soweto, became a new domain, not wholly unlike Harlem.

<sup>5</sup>The phrase is that of Professor R. E. van der Ross, vice chancellor of the University of the Western Cape, as quoted by Mike Cottee, "S[.] Africa Could Be Good Samaritan," *The Star* (airmail), August 20, 1977, p. 14.

<sup>6</sup>Consult Edwin S. Redkey, *Black Exodus: Black Nationalist and Back-to-Africa Movements, 1890-1910* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).

<sup>7</sup>See the penetrating analysis by Tim Patten, "Removal of a Birthright," *The Star* (airmail), August 20, 1977, p. 15.

<sup>8</sup>As reported in "Transkei Refuses Evicted Squatters," *The Star* (airmail), August 13, 1977, p. 5.

<sup>9</sup>For a scholarly analysis of the difficulties facing this homeland, see Jeffrey Butler, Robert I. Rotberg, and John Adams, *The Black Homelands of South Africa: the Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

<sup>10</sup>"New Name for Corporation," *The Star* (airmail), July 9, 1977, p. 2. Data on the level of investment are given in "Homelands Investment of R132m up to June," *The Star* (airmail), September 3, 1977, p. 16.

<sup>11</sup>An example of this point of view is Barbara Rogers, *White Wealth and Black Poverty: American Investments in Southern Africa* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976).



The Sowetons cherished their identity as city folk and seemed to prefer the economic prospects of city life, rife with crime and violence, to the cultural doldrums of their homelands. Yet life in Soweto (and similar African satellite townships encircling the segregated cities) always contained an element of uncertainty, given the migratory patterns of labor and the Africans' right to become permanent and settled inhabitants. There were Africans whose ties to the homelands were attenuated, whose goals for economic advancement went beyond the level of unskilled labor, and whose voracious appetite for Western-style education could not be met by a curriculum (called Bantu education) designed by whites for exclusively black consumption. And these urban-dwelling Africans were serving to falsify the hypotheses about African behavior advanced by the theoreticians of apartheid. Moreover, the gulf between white and black widened, and this gulf, in turn, was apparently less wide than the gulf between black generations. The black urban teenager, particularly the more favored secondary school student, expressed his rage in the 1976 Soweto disturbances, disturbances that were repeated through other urban areas in South Africa, albeit on a smaller scale, during the first anniversary of the Soweto riots. The toll in lives lost and property damaged was much less in 1977 than in 1976, in part because the South African police had become far more sophisticated in the techniques of urban riot control. In addition, in 1977 the South African economy took a deflationary plunge; unemployment and economic despair among the Africans thereafter contributed to lessened violence.<sup>12</sup>

Out of the turmoil of the 1976 and 1977 Soweto

<sup>12</sup>For a detailed analysis, with statistics, of the 1976 Soweto and other African township disturbances, see Horrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-87. For 1977, see *The Star* (airmail), June 11, 18, 25, and July 2, 1977.

<sup>13</sup>"Soweto Leaders Walkout," *The Star* (airmail), June 4, 1977, p. 3; "Soweto Ten Plead for Elections," *The Star* (airmail), July 30, 1977, p. 1; "Key Issues at Stake in Soweto," *The Star* (airmail), July 30, 1977, p. 1; "Mulder Hits at Plan," *The Star* (airmail), July 30, 1977, p. 1; "Homelands Join As Black 'United Front' Shapes Up," *The Star* (airmail), July 30, 1977, p. 2; "Soweto—City of the Future," *The Star* (airmail), July 30, 1977, p. 5; and "MPs Hail Soweto Blueprint," *The Star* (airmail), July 30, 1977, p. 5.

<sup>14</sup>See Sheridan W. Johns, "Opposition in Southern Africa: Segments, Linkages, and Cohesion," in Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard, eds., *Cooperation and Conflict in Southern Africa: Papers on a Regional Subsystem* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1976), pp. 184-227.

<sup>15</sup>A well-documented attack on the severity and human costs of such a system may be found in Anthony S. Mathews, *Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa* (Cape Town: Juta & Company, Ltd., 1971), while justifications of the system will be found in Michael Morris, *Fuzzversus: Police and Students in South Africa: Another View* (Cape Town: Jeremy Spence, 1973) and in Gerard Ludi, *Operation Q-018* (Cape Town: Nasionale Boekhandel Bpk., 1969).

demonstrations the adults of Soweto gained a reinvigorated sense of community. The system of Urban Bantu Councils was discredited, and a group of Africans, termed the Council of Ten, were thrust into crucial leadership roles. The Council has been anxious to secure black legitimation by means of an election held without respect to ethnic origins (a principle diametrically opposed to the purist version of apartheid) and has carefully drafted plans for a model city for blacks in Johannesburg. This model city carried a price tag that bore little relationship to the revenue of Soweto and was dismissed as a figment of Soweton imagination by the white official charged with the governance of Soweto. Yet opposition political parties in the all-white House of Assembly greeted the plans of the Council of Ten as a thoughtful attempt to redress the all too obvious grievances of urban Africans.

The Council intimated that it might seek to join political forces with the leaders of the several African homelands, attempting to frustrate the well-worn policies of divide (by ethnic unit) and rule (by ethnic unit).<sup>13</sup> Were such an alliance consummated it would give the homeland leaders access to politically alert audiences containing both Xhosas and Batswana, and provide these kinsmen with a measure of political clout with the government in Pretoria which, having created and legitimated the homeland leaders, must hear them out. These leaders (like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of the KwaZulu homeland for Zulu-speakers) can perhaps remonstrate with representatives of the white power structures in a manner that may result in an unpleasant encounter with the Bureau of State Security.<sup>14</sup> Those African political organizations that have shown themselves capable of mass mobilization of Africans and that are suspected of advocating the use of armed force to achieve African majority rule have been banned and have disappeared into exile or underground. Black exhortation to blacks can shade off almost imperceptibly into incitement to violence, depending on the listener. An element of decoding the rhetoric of politics may be involved. Talk is neither cheap nor without risk in a land noted for the rigor and ubiquity of its security apparatus.<sup>15</sup>

## THE DEFENSE OF THE REALM

Like the Minutemen of Lexington and most of the delegates to the 1787 Philadelphia Convention, the Afrikaners have a tradition of the citizen-soldier and have found standing armies a threat to their self-defined liberty. The well-known Boer commandos of the 1899-1902 South African War acquitted themselves very well against the Tommy Atkinses of Kiplingesque fame. But they were hardly professionals and often had to rely on the services of foreign volunteers who had Anglophobic axes to grind. South African forces became more proficient in the martial arts in World Wars I and II and were able to build an Anglo-Afrikaner amalgam of military prowess that proved its worth in France, North

Africa, South West Africa, Tanganyika and Ethiopia. Jan C. Smuts, moreover, was elevated by his former enemies to a field marshalship in the South African War. Perhaps in keeping with the Afrikaner tradition, ex-officers of the Defense Force are only infrequently elected to Parliament, and the Minister of Defense has been judged by a panel of experts to be the fifth-ranked portfolio within the Cabinet.<sup>16</sup> Although it has often been termed a police state by those who detest the system of apartheid, the South African political system on the evidence cannot be described as a garrison state. Military personnel have not penetrated the political system to any marked extent and are not managers of the current political dispensation.

Defense budgets rise, year after year, and the defense budget constitutes a significant portion of the total government budget. However, when one measures it against the gross national product and considers the rate of inflation, it is not particularly awesome.<sup>17</sup> Cost structures, moreover, may be somewhat distorted by the fact that South Africa is not a free agent in terms of military hardware and software and lacks unimpeded access to the international arms market because of a United Nations arms embargo. Hence, her ground forces are becoming increasingly self-sufficient in terms of supplies and ordnance, while a substantial number of airplanes are built in South Africa under foreign license. The

<sup>16</sup>Consult Newell M. Stultz, *Who Goes to Parliament?* Occasional Paper no. 19 (Grahamstown: Rhodes University Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1975), pp. 25, 65, and 77.

<sup>17</sup>See the discussion in South Africa, Department of Defence, *White Paper on Defence, 1977*. W.P.F.-1977 (n.p.: author, 1977), pp. 11-14. This White Paper noted (on p. 12) that the 1976-1977 defense expenditure of R 1.4076 billion amounted to 17 percent of the budget but only 4.9 percent of the South African GNP.

<sup>18</sup>Further details are given in Isebill V. Gruhn, *British Arms Sales to South Africa: The Limits of African Diplomacy*, Studies in Race and Nations, vol. 3, no. 3 (Denver: University of Denver Center on International Race Relations, 1972); J.E. Spence, *The Political and Military Framework*, Foreign Investment in South Africa Study Project Paper no. 4 (n.p.: Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia [South-West Africa], 1975, distributed by Africa Publications Trust, London); and G.C. Lawrie, "The Simonstown Agreement: South Africa, Britain and the Commonwealth," *The South African Law Journal*, vol. 85, part 2 (May, 1968), pp. 157-177.

<sup>19</sup>Horrell, *op. cit.*, p. 35; "Transkei Army Volunteers Get Cracking," *Paratus* (Pretoria), vol. 26, no. 9 (September, 1975), pp. 8-9; and "Historic Occasion for Bophutatswana as Homeland Decides on Its Own Defence Force," *Paratus*, vol. 28, no. 2 (February, 1977), p. 15.

<sup>20</sup>Consult Spence, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-80; "Carter Speech Defuses Nuclear Bomb Row," *The Star* (airmail), August 27, 1977, p. 5; "Russia 'May Counter SA Moves,'" *The Star* (airmail), August 27, 1977, p. 5; "Kalahari 'Bomb Site' a Mystery," *The Star* (airmail), August 27, 1977, p. 5; "We'll Have A-Bomb If We Want," *The Star* (airmail), September 3, 1977, p. 5; and "We Halted Kalahari Blast, Says Washington," *The Star* (airmail), September 3, 1977, p. 12.

navy, in particular, is vulnerable to external pressure because South Africa has not had a long tradition of shipbuilding. Bounded by both the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, South Africa traditionally relied on the British Royal Navy for her seaward defenses. Slowly but surely, the South African Navy is developing its equipment and its level of expertise. Under the terms of the so-called Simonstown Agreement drafted at the height of the Cold War and before the massive decolonization of Africa, the British were the traditional suppliers of the South African Navy. That role has since been assumed by the Fifth French Republic, which has provided submarines and aircraft to the South African Defense Force. Only recently has France begun to experience the wrath of the African states because of these arms sales, a wrath hitherto directed against the British government, particularly when it was headed by a Conservative Prime Minister. The customary answer to this African complaint has been to maintain that the weapons were to be used only for defense against foreign states. Such an answer, however, has ignored the multiple uses of military hardware. The Africans are familiar with the use to which the Portuguese armed forces put NATO weapons; their cynicism was based on experience.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to lengthening the period of active duty for conscripts and reservists in 1977, the Defense Force has trained mini-armies for the Transkei and Bophutatswana governments and has accepted blacks into the force—a policy at sharp variance with the Afrikaner military heritage.<sup>19</sup> Traditionally, non-whites had been enrolled in non-combatant units (like pioneer and labor battalions); white anxiety about arming blacks stemmed from the innumerable frontier wars between Boer commandos and African tribal regiments. Recently, government spokesmen have also referred with pride to South African achievements in the field of nuclear engineering, including the production of enriched uranium. Observers of South African defense policies have questioned whether, as a non-signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation pact, the South African Defense Force would opt for a nuclear capability or deterrent. Press reports intimated that tests in the Kalahari Desert region (which spreads to Botswana as well as to Namibia) might be a prelude to an official announcement that Pretoria had joined the ranks of the nuclear powers. When the Soviet Union and Western nations expressed anxiety about such a nuclear démarche, the nuclear controversy abated.<sup>20</sup>

Just how far South Africa intends to go in the direction of nuclear arms is not clear given the state of her economy, the patterns of warfare and counterinsurgency her military and paramilitary units have encountered in urban South Africa, northern Namibia, southern Angola and the Zambesi Valley in Rhodesia, and her calculations of hostile Western and Soviet intentions. The showing of the Soviet flag in the Indian Ocean has been a source of consternation to defense-minded South

Africans. But whether the current state of nuclear weapons development—if indeed there is such development—would be sufficient to match the perceived Soviet naval threat is a moot point. The fate of white South Africa depends more on her political and diplomatic skills, coupled with economic inducements, than on her military hardware.

## NAMIBIA

When one crosses the Orange River, the northern perimeter of the Cape Province, and enters Namibia, one encounters many of the same problems besetting South Africa, but on a smaller geographical, demographic, and economic scale. The ramifications of the problems and the political dispensation in the territory, however, involve a wider range of international participants, spectators, and kibitzers. The territory changed its early name, Transgariep (the territory lying beyond the Gariep, as the Orange River was once termed), to German South West Africa in the late nineteenth century; after the defeat of Germany in World War I, it became simply South-West Africa. Now the territory is known as Namibia in the parlance of the United Nations and by many other nations and groups. Ever since 1920, when South Africa was awarded a fiduciary trust to administer the territory under the benign auspices of the League of Nations (most of whose member states merely wanted to improve the public administration aspects of colonialism rather than to terminate the system of colonial rule), the international community has had a stake in the well-being of the territory.<sup>21</sup>

After World War II, the territory grew more valuable as a result of increasing copper mining, offshore diamond dredging, coastal fishing, and livestock and karakul sheep ranching. The treasury in Pretoria was generous in grants to the territory and its white agricultural community and subsidized the operations of the railway system. The white community in the territory, divided among Afrikaners, English-speakers, and Germans (some of whom were interned during World War II by the Jan Smuts government), enjoyed a considerable degree of self-rule, while the black inhabitants were treated in the traditional, paternalistic manner.<sup>22</sup> African political consciousness was slow to emerge, because of a rather harsh German system of rule (characterized by African insurgency and sanguinary German counterinsurgency campaigns against certain ethnic groups), a slow rate of industrialization, and a rigid geographical separation of whites and non-whites in the northern portion of the territory.

With the defeat of the Axis powers and the establishment of the United Nations at San Francisco in 1945, the Africans in Namibia found themselves in a world far removed from that of the League of Nations era. The United Nations, whatever its other functions, was an engine of destruction of the Western colonial rule in Asia and Africa and a forum for the articulation of non-Western grievances. The Smuts government and its successors were unwilling to transfer South West Africa to the jurisdiction of the United Nations, fearing that this would afford the world body increased leverage against the system of racial dominance practiced in the territory. For its part, the United Nations refused Field Marshal Smuts permission to incorporate the territory as the fifth province of South Africa.

Thereafter, there was a vituperative interaction between South Africa and the United Nations with regard to the territory's political future, with the International Court of Justice the fulcrum around which the forces were arrayed. The Western powers tended to prefer a judicial settlement; the African states insisted that the problem was political. When, on a technicality in 1966, the Court dismissed the case against South Africa brought by Liberian and Ethiopian plaintiffs, the stage was set for non-judicial conflict resolution. Since 1966, the country has experienced a sporadic, low-intensity guerrilla war in the northern areas that border on Angola and Zambia.

The Verwoerd government attempted to encapsulate growing African political consciousness by extending the South African homeland policy, which was put into effect in the north in Owambo, an area contiguous to Angola that had never been subjected to German supervision or to subsequent direct South African administration. Although the government of Owambo has gained stature in Pretoria's view, many Ovambos (those who come from Owambo, as the homeland is now designated) were attracted to the modern credo of SWAPO, the South West African Peoples' Organization of Namibia, which enjoys the primacy of place among Namibian liberation groups and has been endorsed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). SWAPO, which appeals to non-Ovambos as well, has found it strategic to have an external, overseas wing and an internal wing. The external wing handles the military and diplomatic aspects of liberation, while the internal wing (which has never been banned, strangely enough) continues to expound the party philosophy.

There seemed to be little hope for the application of

(Continued on page 226)

<sup>21</sup>For an account that stresses the international legal aspects of the dispute and is critical of the African position, see Gail-Maryse Cockram, *South West African Mandate* (Cape Town: Juta and Company Limited, 1976).

<sup>22</sup>Those interested in a description of life in the territory from an Afrophilic point of view should consult Colin O'Brien Winter, *Namibia* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1977).

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*"The failure of the SMC to permit broad sectors of the politically conscious Ghanaian public to participate in key economic and political decisions and institutions systematically undermined its capacity to implement those reforms it genuinely sought. . . ."*

# The Decline of Ghana's Military Government

BY JON KRAUS

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**I**N late 1977, the situation in Ghana was deteriorating both for the vast majority of Ghanaians and for the military regime of General Ignatius (Ike) Acheampong, in power since a 1972 coup. Despite the enormous efforts of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) government to expand agricultural development since 1972, there was evidence of declining acreage and production of major food crops. By mid-1977, local food prices had climbed to bewildering heights, putting basic foods beyond the buying power of many Ghanaians.

Although the lowest paid government workers and other workers had won a 35 percent increase in wages in 1976 and another 48 percent increase in July, 1977, these raises could not offset Ghana's extraordinary inflation. The real wage of the lowest paid worker in December, 1976, was still only 53 percent of what it had been in 1963; in mid-1977, it was probably not more than 70 percent. Strongly opposed to a return to civilian rule, the SMC had managed to generate a fairly wide range of support for its vague idea of "union government" as a means of avoiding party politics and retaining a military-police role in any future government. Suddenly, the Ghanaian bourgeoisie of lawyers, doctors, and other professionals undertook a prolonged strike in June-July, 1977, to demand immediate civilian rule. Many Ghanaians harbored profoundly ambiguous feelings about civilian politicians and a substantial degree of doubt that any government could bring substantial improvements in their lives.

In several senses, the SMC government tried to be a genuinely reformist military government. Its massive failures cast light both on Ghana and on the general phenomenon of military rule in Africa.

In January, 1972, Colonel I. K. Acheampong and three majors overthrew the civilian regime of Kofi Busia and established the National Redemption Council (NRC) government, which changed in composition and name in 1975 to become the SMC. The NRC/SMC government is the fourth in Ghana since independence: the civilian Convention People's party (CPP) government, led by Kwame Nkrumah, 1957-1966; the military police National Liberation Council (NLC),

1966-1969, that ousted the Nkrumah regime; the civilian Progress party (PP) government of Kofi Busia, October, 1969-January, 1972, all preceded the NRC/SMC. Both the quasi-radical and dictatorial Kwame Nkrumah and the semi-democratic Busia government had contributed to Ghana's economic development problems. In terms both of GNP growth and of the actual standard of living of Ghanaians, the economy stagnated during the 1960's. While the Nkrumah government pursued a "socialist" (statist) pattern of development, the successor military NLC and Busia regimes tried to reduce a directly productive role for the state sector, to liberalize the economy, and to encourage domestic and foreign private investment. The economic strategies of these regimes foundered under the weight of persistent economic crises, aggravated by the world market fluctuations of the price of cocoa, which accounts for about 70 percent of Ghana's foreign exchange earnings and one-fourth of its budget revenues. By the end of 1971, inept and authoritarian politics, the grossly ostentatious life-style of leading politicians, and economic austerity policies had antagonized and alienated crucial sectors of the public, including cocoa farmers, trade unions, students, civil servants and the military — whose budget was slashed and whose leadership was juggled politically. The final nail in the regime's coffin was a draconian devaluation of 45 percent in December, 1971, which increased the dollar cost of imports by 90 percent.

Acheampong sought to legitimize his bloodless coup by arguing that "every honest Ghanaian will agree with me that malpractices, corruption, arbitrary dismissals [of civil servants], economic mismanagement and a host of other malpractices which characterized the Nkrumah regime [had] come back to stay with us." The regime courted the support of critical groups by moving quickly to revalue the Ghanaian currency, to abolish a new "development levy" tax and several other taxes, to return some amenities and fringe benefits to the civil service and the military, to restore the Trades Union Congress (abolished by Busia), and to ensure that cocoa farmers were paid in cash rather than in chits. In succeeding weeks, the Acheampong government demon-



strated the economic nationalism that became its hallmark, disavowing "the image of the Beggar Nation created by Busia."

Ghana's foreign exchange was virtually exhausted. The NRC government repudiated medium-term debts (supplier credits) of £35 million to British firms that were tainted with corruption. It unilaterally declared that all other medium-term loans would be repaid over 50 years on low-interest terms, that the enormous short-term debts (import credits, foreign firm earnings) would be paid only as and when the government could repay them, and that long-term debts would be fully honored. This bold measure led to an end of all Western aid and forced the regime to purchase all imports with cash. But it was greeted enthusiastically by Ghanaians. (Prolonged negotiations with Western creditor countries resulted in a settlement highly advantageous to Ghana two years later.) Emphasizing that Ghana would have to become self-reliant, the NRC energetically launched an "Operation Feed Yourself" campaign, in which the government allocated large portions of the budget to agricultural credits, disease control, and extension services. Members of the NRC toured the country, encouraging all Ghanaians to increase the production of agricultural foodstuffs so that Ghana, an agricultural country, could eliminate food imports and reduce food prices.

These policies developed substantial enthusiasm for the NRC regime, but in the years that followed the political strategy of the NRC induced little broad support for its economic development programs. Thus the NRC had great difficulty in achieving popular compliance with its policies. The NRC's political strategy was influenced by failures of the previous regimes. First, virtually all widely recognized civilian elite groups had been discredited—the petty bourgeois, the populist "small boys" and socialists of the Nkrumah regime, and the "best brains" of the Busia government, drawn from the emerging bourgeoisie of businessmen, lawyers, senior civil servants, and academics. Second, no political institutions that could claim legitimacy remained, and the NRC offered Ghanaians none. The Busia regime by its behavior and policies and the NRC by its coup helped to discredit liberal democratic and representative institutions. (Responding to the charge that he had overthrown a democratic government, Acheampong could readily note some of the Busia government's undemocratic practices, including its failure for over two years to hold local government elections; moreover, he believed that "the principle of one man, one vote is meaningless unless it is linked up with the principle of one man, one bread. A government that operates on the basis of ten men, one bread for the broad masses is unjust, and unjust rulers do not deserve to be sustained by any theoretical conceptions of democracy.")

Given this environment, Acheampong and the NRC

of junior officers chose to follow an "anti-politics" political strategy: the regime's political and administrative arms would be the military, the civil service, and the chiefs; its power base was the military itself. It would dispense with civilian participation in government but would recognize and deal with the genuine grievances and needs of established representative groups (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce, the Ghana Employers' Association, the Trades Union Congress, the chiefs). The NRC was far more willing than the previous military regime to interfere directly with the administration of the country. While working with and dependent on senior civil servants, the NRC had little confidence in civil service capabilities. More than one-third of the officer corps was involved in the government, serving as ministers (commissioners), regional heads, and chairmen (and often managing directors) of all state enterprises, public boards and even municipal councils. In the case of important institutions, like the Ghana National Trading Corporation that played a central role in distribution, the NRC appointed commissioned and noncommissioned officers as counterparts to civilian heads at the regional and district levels. At least in the beginning, NRC administration was very active, trying to overcome civil service lethargy and to ensure the implementation of NRC directives and development projects. In 1972, a Subversion Decree established military tribunals to deal not only with actual subversive acts but also with crimes treated leniently or ignored in the past, in particular, stealing, hoarding and smuggling. Trials of smugglers and hoarders were held and some draconian sentences were handed out, but such vigorous actions did not persist.

### A PERIOD OF CONFUSION

Acheampong and the majors who led the coup devoted particular attention to maintaining the military as a secure power base. Immediately after the coup in January, there was a period of confusion; it was not clear which officers would be included in the National Redemption Council and several lists were issued in the first several days. The service chiefs were all included, but early in 1973 they were removed from the NRC. Then, after the October, 1975, coup in Nigeria that removed General Yakubu Gowon, Acheampong mounted a coup against his own regime, creating the Supreme Military Council over the NRC (which soon withered) to which the service chiefs, the head of the Border Guards, and the Inspector-General of Police were appointed by virtue of their offices. This initiated a near crisis in the regime; since it led to the exclusion of the core of former majors who had been Acheampong's allies, they quickly resigned from the NRC and from the army. This was only the most dramatic of a number of changes within the ruling NRC/SMC and among the government commissioners, changes occasioned by policy disagreements, conflicts and suspicions.

In 1973, Commissioner of Agriculture Major General D. K. Addo and the Health Commissioner resigned on grounds of "ill health"; another early coup participant, Lieutenant Colonel C. D. Benni, Commissioner of Information, also resigned, apparently in protest against corruption. There were also changes among the service chiefs as Acheampong dealt with the delicate problem that lower ranking officers on the NRC were giving orders to higher ranking officers in the military. In order to avoid the jealousy over promotions that had characterized the NLC military government, Acheampong put a freeze on promotions and kept his own rank as colonel until 1976. Inadequately explained resignations of leading government members have continued: the Chief of Defense Staff Ashley-Lassen, a leading NRC member, was suddenly retired in December, 1974, having "completed his term of office"; Major Kwame Asante, an extremely aggressive and arrogant coup leader who as minister in two capacities managed to antagonize the unions and the business community, retired in mid-1974; Colonel Bernasko, the able commissioner for agriculture and then cocoa affairs, was precipitously retired from the armed forces in 1975.

At times there was a high level of grievance among the officer corps, and even Acheampong admitted that there were "rumors galore" of coup attempts and "concerted attempts to subvert the armed forces" during 1974. One of the major complaints concerned corruption among the officers assigned to government positions; some senior officers were building new homes in exclusive residential areas or were seen driving prohibitively priced Mercedes. There were critical meetings between NRC leaders and commissioned and non-commissioned officers; in July, 1974, Acheampong created an Armed Forces Advisory Council to maintain communications between the military and the NRC. However, the council was allowed to lapse into inactivity and had to be "reconstituted" several years later.

Acheampong employed several means of dealing with grievances in the military: some officers were simply "retired"; a significant number of senior officers were sent abroad as ambassadors or high commissioners; there was a frequent reshuffling of ministerial portfolios, regional commissioners (the administrative heads of regions), and heads of public boards and corporations. While this may have lessened officer corps grievances and reduced corruption, it also undoubtedly sharply reduced the ability of the officers to learn and perform their civilian responsibilities adequately. The constant shifts among military leaders made the NRC/SMC more dependent on the civil service, which has developed a decided tendency to avoid risks.

At the same time, it was evident to many Ghanaians that some officers were engaged in the corruption that is rampant in Ghana. The Anin commission on corruption reported in 1975: "The devout have vanished from the land. Corruption is endemic throughout the

whole society." General Acheampong's wife was widely rumored to have wangled the lucrative agency rights to an imported luxury car; important officers' wives were known to have become large traders in imported commodities; and some military regional commissioners acknowledged openly that prisons were only for the poor, without friends "at the top." The sudden "retirement" in late 1976 of the 42-year-old chief of defense staff, one of Acheampong's closest associates and the former director of military intelligence, and of the Air Force commander led to rumors of their involvement in a scandal, rumors that were confirmed several weeks later. These generals, three prominent lawyers in Accra and a businessman had avoided the enormous import duties and purchase taxes on luxury Mercedes Benz; they were required to, and did, pay the taxes and a fine (the two officers, £348,000, £1=\$1.15), but, as usual, criminal charges were not preferred and Ghanaians wondered where the defendants acquired the incredible sums. Thus far, the NRC/SMC has been able to prevent any major coup attempts against itself from within the armed forces, but virtually every year there has been a major trial of coup plotters, always involving military personnel.

#### HOSTILITY TOWARD CIVILIANS

Initial interest in associating some "eminent" civilians with the NRC government was quickly abandoned in the face of strong resistance within the NRC. The persistence of a marked antagonism within the NRC to any semi-regular civilian participation reflected several beliefs: "politics" and politicians were the source of Ghana's problems, and "politics" itself could be put aside; all politicians (CPP, PP, and others) had been discredited; and the NRC should retain power indefinitely, or at least until that distant future when the economy is again prosperous. Thus, pressures from Ghana's politically articulate sectors that they should be part of the regime were met with brief gestures, like the formation of the National Consultative Assembly in January, 1974 (which was never heard of after its appointment) or, more frequently, were strongly repudiated. In 1974, when several independent Ghanaian newspapers commented on the problems of military regimes elsewhere and noted that the politicians' inadequacies did not give the military a license to rule indefinitely, Acheampong responded by asserting the superiority of military rule. Soldiers were "better trained than politicians for administering with competence the affairs of the nation." The military had all the skilled personnel they needed and could show the politicians that they could cope with any situation. In 1976, Acheampong and other officers alluded to a plan to restore civilian rule at some future date; the SMC would inform Ghanaians when it was ready to do so.

Coupled with this rejection of the right of civilians to participate in governing was the NRC/SMC's need

for civilian assistance for the cooperation of important groups and economic sectors, and for public support if it were to carry out its programs. Acheampong selected various advisers on an ad hoc basis, including some former CPP leaders and some specialists associated with the opposition party during the Busia government, primarily economists and other technocrats. He also made overtures to important organized groups and unorganized sectors. The government recognized and dealt directly with organized groups, encouraging the communication of grievances and attempting to meet claims for action in material and symbolic terms in exchange for group support for NRC goals. Acheampong then held the groups responsible for the behavior of their members. Among the most important of these groups are the trade unions, various business organizations (Chamber of Commerce, Ghana Employers and Contractors' Associations), the Bar Association, market women's associations, and the National Union of Ghanaian Students. With regard to these groups, the government has adopted a semi-corporatist orientation. Because of a low level of organization among farmers, the government has dealt with the critically important agricultural sector primarily by means of administrative agencies, chiefs (who are now normally educated), ad hoc audiences with NRC leaders, and intermittent tours by NRC leaders and the officers who head the regional administrations. On such tours, lengthy speeches are made and exhortations are mixed with dire warnings; not much consultation occurs.

The NRC acted in 1973 to reinvigorate local and district councils; it allocated to itself the right to select two-thirds of the members and gave chiefs the right to choose the other third. Only the chairmanship is elective. This modest level of participation has been influenced by the poverty of local council roles and resources. Relying solely on minor head taxes and various fees for revenue, these councils must constantly look to the central government—or to regional headquarters—for the meager development and administrative funds made available from the taxing powers of the central government.

Although its relations with the unions have been far friendlier than its relations with most other organizations, the NRC's relationship with the trade unions may serve as an example of its governing style and the limits of its strategy. The TUC, the labor center, had been abolished by the Busia government; strong interventionist controls had been imposed, a divide-and-rule politics had been used to split and weaken the union movement; union finances had been totally disrupted by the legal invalidation of existing check-offs and the requirement of written check-off permissions from each worker. The trade unions welcomed NRC rule with massive marches of support in major cities. In the relationship which developed, the NRC met certain union demands—by no means all—in exchange

TABLE 1: STRIKE ACTIVITY

	strikes	strikers	man-days lost
1970	58	21,467	145,107
1971	78	46,715	133,096
1972	14	3,711	5,281
1973	14	4,443	4,307

for TUC and national union acceptance of NRC policies. The primary union interests were in the areas of union autonomy, TUC and check-off restoration, representation, and wages. The NRC abolished the Busia government legislation, thus restoring check-offs and the TUC but, against union wishes, it kept the TUC as hostage to future legal changes. Nonetheless, it recognized union autonomy in many important ways, including financial autonomy (turning over ownership of TUC headquarters and the Labor College to the TUC and writing off past tax arrears). In a number of important areas, it gave union leaders representation on ad hoc and permanent government boards and commissions and generally recognized the TUC as the valid spokesman for worker interests.

The government was primarily interested in holding down government wage bills, dampening inflation, and preventing any strike activity. Strikes were illegal under existing legislation, which stipulated lengthy and time-consuming conciliation and arbitration procedures. The government took tough and prompt measures to curtail any strikes that broke out, applying strong pressures on union leaders to control wildcat strikes. Its success in stopping strike activities, at least during 1972-1973, can be seen by comparing its record with the two years of heavy strikes preceding the NRC (1970-1971). (See Table 1.)

However, the consequences of its action against strikes were twofold. First, the strong union discouragement of strikes opened up a large gulf between leaders and the rank and file members. Second, although union leaders were initially successful in persuading the NRC to pressure management to cooperate with the unions, such pressure soon stopped. Especially in the government sector, in the absence of strikes, union claims were ignored and buried in bureaucratic lethargy. Thus,

(Continued on page 227)

**Jon Kraus** is the author of "Political Change, Conflict and Development in Ghana," in Philip Foster and Aristide Zolber, eds., *Ghana and the Ivory Coast* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); "Socialism and Political Economy in Ghana," in Helen Desfosses and Jacque Levesque, eds., *Socialism in the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1975); and "The Political Economy of Industrial Relations in Ghana," in Ukandi Dimachi and Lester Trachtman, eds., *Industrial Relations in Africa* (London: Macmillan, forthcoming).

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*"Unfortunately, the people of Zimbabwe will probably not be able to forge their own destiny for years to come. Since the colonial era, the political and economic status of that strategically situated land has affected its neighbors, and for that reason Zimbabwe's future will be inextricably involved with them."*

## Rhodesia and Her Neighbors

BY RICHARD W. HULL

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THE Rhodesian crisis can be understood and solved only within the context of Rhodesia's relations with her neighbors because the economies and transportation systems of southern Africa are interlocked. Their infrastructures are orphans of the colonial era and the present leaders are their helpless prisoners. This fateful interdependence was not fully grasped after Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November, 1965, but was understood after Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's decision in January, 1973, to close his country's border with Zambia.

Before that epochal move, trade circulated remarkably freely among the southern African states, and the economies of all prospered. Then, in December, 1972, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) opened a guerrilla front in northeastern Rhodesia. The move was a critical turning point, for it marked the beginning of a sustained and well-organized African nationalist drive against the Smith regime. The Rhodesian Prime Minister closed the border with Zambia, rationalizing that ZANU arms had originated there. He hoped that his action would persuade Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda to cease providing a sanctuary for ZANU forces. But Kaunda knew that if he capitulated he risked losing face among his own people and in the community of African nations. He stood firm, even though the border's closure disrupted a rail line that handled 60 percent of Zambia's foreign trade.

In landlocked Zambia, copper exports accounted for nearly 90 percent of the nation's foreign exchange earnings. The economy could not indefinitely survive without access to major seaports along roads and railways capable of handling the large bulk tonnage of her copper. Since colonial days, much of this ore had been shipped out of the Mozambique port of Beira via Rhodesia Railways, economically the shortest and most efficient route to the sea and beyond. The loss of Zambian trade also placed strains on the Rhodesian economy; yet when Smith offered to reopen the frontier, Kaunda declined to reciprocate.

An even greater turning point came with the collapse of Portuguese power in southern Africa after the Lisbon coup in April, 1974. Portugal's decision to grant independence to Mozambique made it possible to implement the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 in which 13 African nations had called on Rhodesia either to negotiate a transfer of power to majority rule or to face an armed struggle. Until the Portuguese coup, Smith ignored the manifesto. As long as Mozambique, Rhodesia's main access to the sea, remained in Portuguese hands, Smith's regime could be assured of easy trade with the outside world and a peaceful eastern border. The white Rhodesian honeymoon suddenly came to an end; and Smith was forced into a negotiating stance. South Africa, too, recognized the dangers of a hostile Mozambique on its eastern frontier and decided to join the détente exercise.

In December, the black Rhodesian leaders, Joshua Nkomo of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU, were released from prison and allowed to fly to Lusaka with Rhodesian Bishop Abel Muzorewa and his African National Council (ANC) for a conference with the Presidents of Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana. There the three Presidents organized themselves into an informal consultative body subsequently referred to as the "Front Line States." Later, they would be joined by Presidents Agostinho Neto of Angola and Samora Machel of Mozambique.

The conference tried to find ways to translate the principles of the Lusaka Manifesto into practice. Hoping to achieve a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia, the Front Line States immediately entered into a series of futile détente exercises with Ian Smith and South Africa's Prime Minister John Vorster. The Front Line States also initiated the first of repeated efforts to unite the various African nationalist groups in order to establish a single negotiating bloc. The ANC was enlarged into a united movement, embracing the rival exiled groups: ZANU, ZAPU, and Frolizi, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe. Their leaders were



pressured into signing a Declaration of Unity in December, 1974, under the chairmanship of Rhodesia's first black bishop, the American-educated Abel Muzorewa. Only Robert Mugabe, a ZANU subordinate, refused to accept Muzorewa's leadership. Muzorewa, a mild-mannered Methodist cleric, enjoyed considerable prestige in Rhodesia; yet in subsequent months he failed to forge a united nationalist movement among the armed guerrilla factions that operated from external bases. He proved to be a man of the cloth, not of the gun.

Another act in the Rhodesian drama opened in June, 1975, when Mozambique became an independent Marxist state. Mozambique's President, Samora Machel, had for years been a leader of Frelimo, the guerrilla army dedicated to overthrowing Portuguese rule. Machel, a firm believer in armed struggle, now allowed ZANU to use Mozambique as a staging base against Rhodesia. Within months, the Mozambique-Rhodesian border became operationally active. Mugabe, who had been released from detention in Rhodesia, started to establish military camps in Mozambique. He lashed out against President Kaunda for stifling the armed struggle by refusing to allow guerrilla incursions from Zambia. He accused the Zambian President of naively pursuing a peaceful transformation of power in Rhodesia. Since then, relations between the two men have been cool and distant.

Mugabe found his allies elsewhere. It was soon apparent that there was a strong convergence of revolutionary purpose and ideology among Mugabe as general secretary of ZANU, Mozambique's Machel, and Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere. All three men are well-educated, radical socialists who believe that true independence can be achieved in Africa only by means of total economic and social reconstruction. They are convinced that the Chinese communalistic model of development is better suited to rural Africa than the Soviet revisionist approach. With strong Chinese backing, Machel and Nyerere began to throw their weight behind Mugabe. Nyerere's support was particularly important because of his position as chairman of the Front Line States.

Bishop Muzorewa fared less well. His lack of success in negotiating with Vorster and Smith at the August, 1975, Victoria Falls conference, had spurred the Front Line States later that year to cement a relationship between the armies of Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU and Reverend Sithole's ZANU. In November, the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Liberation Committee, headed by a Tanzanian colonel, formed a "third force," consisting of a high command drawn equally from the two nationalist armies. The third force was in reality the product of efforts by Nyerere and Machel to create a single guerrilla army and to end feuding among the various factions. In early 1976, ZANU's head, Reverend Sithole, was expelled from the movement,

and the mantle of leadership passed to Robert Mugabe. By then, the Front Line Presidents had decided that peaceful negotiations had failed and that the issue of majority rule for Rhodesia would be resolved not at diplomatic tables but on the battlefield.

### FRAGILE COOPERATION

A major stumbling block to this approach, however, lay in the divisive nature of the liberation forces. By June, followers of Nkomo and Mugabe were clashing repeatedly in guerrilla training camps in Tanzania and Mozambique. ZANU's military commander, Josiah Tongogara, was accused of assassinating Herbert Chitepo, who at the time of his death had been commander-in-chief of ZANU's army. Muzorewa, in Rhodesia, tried to reassert his authority but was denied access to the guerrilla camps. The fragile spirit of cooperation evaporated and the unified high command soon collapsed. Nkomo's ZAPU army regrouped in Zambia and Botswana, and the third force became in effect a Mozambique-based ZANU army under the political leadership of Robert Mugabe and the military command of Josiah Tongogara and Rex Nhongo. Once again, Nkomo and Mugabe possessed their own, mutually antagonistic armies. Nkomo, a long-time friend of Zambian President Kaunda, continued to receive most of his arms and equipment from the Soviet Union. Conveniently, he centered his operations at Zambia's capital of Lusaka, within easy reach of the 120-man Soviet embassy.

Mozambique's interest in the liberation of Rhodesia intensified after Samora Machel closed the Mozambique border with Rhodesia in March, 1976. Rhodesia consequently lost her rail link with the Mozambique ports of Beira and Maputo, which together handled nearly 60 percent of her external trade. Mozambique's economy also suffered; Mozambique was losing more than \$130 million a year in port revenues and millions more in hard currency remittances from workers formerly working in Rhodesia. A number of foreign nations pledged to make up the loss through grants and loans, although by mid-1977 only a fraction had fulfilled their commitments.

In anticipation of Machel's border decision, in 1974 Rhodesia had opened the Rutenga rail line into South Africa to connect with routes to the port of Durban. Rhodesia's dependence on South Africa grew stronger, because the country's only rail connections with the sea were the Rutenga line and the railway through black-ruled Botswana. South Africa could henceforth play a far stronger role in negotiations on Rhodesia's future with the Front Line States and the Western powers. Oil, which previously flowed into Rhodesia from a Mozambique pipeline, now came exclusively from South Africa. And most of South Africa's oil originated in Iran. Without oil, Rhodesia could be brought to her knees within a few weeks.

In July, 1976, two new guerrilla fronts were opened, one in the northwest along the Zambian border, and the other along the southwestern frontier with Botswana. They were made operational in anticipation of the Geneva conference on Rhodesia, which convened in October. There, Bishop Muzorewa again failed to exert any direct influence on the guerrilla armies, or on the Presidents of the Front Line States. Before the conference, in another attempt at unification, the Front Line Presidents put together the so-called Patriotic Front and placed it under the joint leadership of the men with the weapons, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. As chairman of the Front Line States, Tanzania's President Nyerere rationalized that only Nkomo and Mugabe enjoyed the backing of the liberation armies. The Front Line Presidents argued further that because Bishop Muzorewa had no army, he could never hope to bargain from a position of power with the well-armed Rhodesian government. The Presidents failed to concede, however, that many men in the ZANU army were actually Muzorewa partisans. Later, at the Geneva Conference, the Front Line States made it clear that the bishop was not their candidate for black leadership in Rhodesia, even though he enjoyed the largest popular following in the country and seemed to bridge the gap between the two major ethnic groups, the Shona and the Ndebele. The United States State Department had also decided to withdraw support from the bishop and to concentrate on Joshua Nkomo, hoping to ease him away from dependence on the Soviet Union.

The political marriage between Nkomo and Mugabe was one of convenience and compromise, an effort by the Front Line States to restore unity to the fissiparous liberation forces. But it was a poor effort indeed. The Front Line States' leaders failed to endow the Patriotic Front with a central organization, a common spokesperson, and a unified military command. The Front was a curious alliance between Mugabe, a Chinese-supported doctrinaire Socialist determined to rid an independent Zimbabwe of all traces of Western capitalism, and Nkomo, a pragmatic Socialist willing to compromise with the West on fundamental economic issues. In effect, Mugabe possessed an ideology, a clear conception of what Rhodesia should be when it became black-ruled Zimbabwe. Nkomo, Sithole and Muzorewa, on the other hand, had no blueprint for the future. Muzorewa and Sithole appealed to the moderate black intelligentsia and to the non-political churchgoers, Nkomo to the old-line middle-aged nationalists who had supported him for more than two decades, and Mugabe, to a new generation of idealistic and militant youth.

In January, 1977, the curtain opened on a new scene in the Rhodesian drama, when Kaunda, despairing of any peaceful diplomatic settlement, welcomed the establishment of guerrilla camps along his frontier with Rhodesia. Kaunda persuaded Botswana's President, Seretse Khama, to do likewise. An active massive re-

cruitment program inside Rhodesian territory began immediately. In a single evening in late January, 400 Rhodesian students were transported across the Botswana border for guerrilla training and political education. The liberation armies had decided to win the hearts and minds of teenage youth. Indeed, within months, the established average age of the guerrilla fighter dropped from 22 to 15.

Rhodesia responded to the escalation in guerrilla recruitment by ordering a military call-up of all able-bodied white, colored and Asian men between the ages of 38 and 50. This was a desperate move, because Rhodesia's economy was already suffering from a shortage of skilled manpower, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, military expenditures had jumped 400 percent from fiscal 1972-1973 to 1976-1977 and were consuming one-fourth of the total national budget. Rhodesian forces were soon thinly stretched along the country's 1842-mile border; with the opening of the Botswana-Zambian fronts, all but the 138 miles of Rhodesia's border with South Africa became vulnerable.

To pay for the expanding armed forces, the sales tax was increased from 5 percent to 15 percent, and an income tax surcharge of 10 percent was imposed. Drastic cutbacks were also made in non-military spending. Tourism, once Rhodesia's third largest earner of foreign exchange, slumped dramatically, due in large part to the widening range of guerrilla attacks. All this came on top of a growing white exodus. In 1976, the net loss was 7,000 whites. In the first half of 1977 it exceeded 5,000. This is a substantial loss, considering that the total white population is in the neighborhood of 269,000 as opposed to more than 6 million blacks, whose population is growing at the astronomical rate of 3.5 percent annually.

The time seemed right for a bold new Soviet initiative. The Soviets, who had remained behind the scenes until 1977, came fully onto the stage. In March, 1977, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny visited the Front Line States and pledged greater military support, particularly for Joshua Nkomo. The Soviets found the economies of the Front Line States in a condition even more precarious than Rhodesia's. Two guerrilla forces opposed to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) threatened to create economic chaos and topple Angola's Marxist regime. Under the leadership of Marxist President Agostinho Neto, the ravaged Angolan economy was continuing to suffer from the secessionist movement in the south. The Benguela Railway across southern Angola, vital to the copper shipments from Zambia and Zaire to Atlantic ports, had been closed since August, 1975, as a result of attacks from Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces. At its peak, the railroad handled 50 percent of Zambia's imports and nearly 60 percent of her copper exports.

UNITA enjoyed broad popular support among the

Ovimbundu, the dominant ethnic group in the south. Their guerrillas had succeeded in cutting coffee production, which was one of Angola's major exports. Within Angola, the continuing civil war disrupted food supplies to the government-held urban areas and deprived the southern port and industrial complex of Lobito-Benjuela of considerable revenues and raw material. All this placed severe financial and security drains on the Marxist regime. Consequently, the beleaguered government turned to the Communist bloc countries for military and technical assistance. By mid-1977, much of the leadership in the Angolan armed forces had passed into the hands of some 19,000 Cubans.

### ZAMBIA AND ZAIRE

Zambia and Zaire were in the same parlous situation. Their economies rest almost entirely on the export of copper, the world price of which had dropped calamitously since 1974. With the closure of the Benguela Railway, Zaire—and to a lesser degree Zambia—began to re-route their ore secretly across Rhodesian Railways to South Africa's Port Elizabeth. By 1976, Zaire was shipping more than 25,000 tons of copper a month through South Africa and importing large quantities of food and machinery from South Africa. Zaire also continued to import Rhodesian coal, essential to her mining operations.

The route to South Africa's ports is long and expensive. Consequently, a growing proportion of Zaire's mineral earnings must be spent on transportation and handling costs. Without the Benguela Railway, there is no economical way to ship bulk metal. Copper production dropped substantially, causing a violent decrease in government revenue and a consequent precipitous decline in economic growth in all sectors of the economy. Zaire's widening deficit in her balance of payments reflected her loss in export receipts. By mid-1977, Zaire was said to owe 11 nations a total of \$1.5 billion. A year earlier, United States and European banks had rescued Zaire from international bankruptcy by agreeing to re-schedule debt payments over a 10-year period. This move brought little relief to the peasant masses living outside the country's financial centers. The drop in living standards and the shortages of staple foods were most acutely felt in the southern province of Shaba, Zaire's most prosperous region in the days when it was called Katanga. Since the early 1970's, the formerly self-reliant population found itself importing much of its meat and grain from South Africa and Rhodesia. Not since the days of the Katangan secession in the 1960's was there so much popular dissatisfaction with the central government.

The economy of neighboring Zambia also showed signs of strain and deterioration. President Kaunda launched a massive re-routing program after the closure of Zambia's border with Rhodesia in 1973. The search

for alternate routes became even more imperative with the disruption of the Benguela Railway. But efforts to find other viable routes were not altogether successful. The tortuous 1,162-mile Tanzania-Zambian railway and the tarred truck route to Tanzania's port of Dar es Salaam were fully operational by late 1976. However, the railroad does not reach into the copperbelt and the truck route cannot carry heavy ores efficiently without severe damage to its roadbed. Moreover, Dar es Salaam has an insufficient number of deep-water berths; consequent jams have led to long delays in moving cargo.

In January, 1976, Zambia and Mozambique signed an agreement for the construction of a road from Katete in Zambia to Mozambique's port of Beira, in order to give Zambia direct access to the sea. The line, however, will not be completed for several years. Meanwhile, Zambia, like Zaire, has suffered the crushing combination of a continuing depression in copper prices and a crippling inflation in the world price for crude oil. To survive, the two countries have placed themselves in the humiliating position of trading with South Africa and Rhodesia, the very states they openly condemn. To make matters worse, Zambia depends on electricity generated at the Kariba hydroelectric facility in Rhodesia.

Mozambique has not been more independent even though she possesses excellent harbors. Fully 80 percent of the nation's foreign exchange earnings are in the form of gold bullion remitted by Mozambicans employed in South African mines and factories. In August, 1977, South Africa revalued her gold reserves, which in effect meant that in the future less gold would flow into Mozambique. This news came on the heels of a United Nations report revealing that Mozambique is running a \$175 million-\$200 million balance of payments deficit and will have to import more than 200,000 tons of rice, corn and wheat. Food imports from Rhodesia have ceased since the border closure and Mozambique will have to turn to South Africa or elsewhere. Mozambique must also contend with a 45 percent decline in port volume at Beira and Maputo.

Since independence, the nation has lost nearly 200,000 Portuguese settlers, many of whom were skilled people. Consequently, many Mozambican institutions are understaffed and mismanaged. White South African engineers and technicians have been called in to maintain the harbors, which handle mostly South African ores. In addition to these desperate crises, the Marxist regime must spend millions of dollars to cope with a right-wing guerrilla movement operating in the northern region and calling itself the Mozambique National Resistance Army (MNRA). And while condemning the racist policies of South Africa, Mozambique sells that nation electricity generated at the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric facility, built by the Portuguese in the final days of colonialism.



## BOTSWANA

Botswana has also been deeply affected by the Rhodesian crisis. The Botswana Railway, formerly owned and operated by Rhodesians, was recently nationalized. It carries most of land-locked Botswana's essential trade through South Africa and 20 percent of Rhodesia's external trade. Botswana remains largely dependent on South Africa, with her exports of beef, copper and diamonds passing out of South African ports. Moreover, 80 percent of Botswana's imports come from South Africa, and some 50,000 Botswanans work in South African mines and industries. The country would risk severe economic sanctions from South Africa were it to close the railroad to Rhodesian traffic. Furthermore, a Canadian consulting group warned that a decision to cut Rhodesia's second to last trade route to South Africa would cost Botswana as much as \$75 million annually in lost trade revenue.

Only South Africa seems to have profited from the Rhodesian situation. Its trade with Zaire and Rhodesia has grown substantially and the dependence of those two nations on the Vorster regime has increased. Although few would admit it, the very existence of the regimes of Machel in Mozambique, President Joseph Mobutu in Zaire and, of course, Smith in Rhodesia rely heavily on Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa.

Soviet President Podgorny's visit to the Front Line States in March, 1977, was another turning point in African affairs; afterwards, the balance of guerrilla power began to shift from Mugabe's ZANU to Nkomo's ZAPU. Podgorny's presence in southern Africa was punctuated by an Angolan-based invasion of Zaire's copper-rich Shaba province and the assassination of pro-Chinese President Marien Ngouabi of the Congo. Zaire had long been a thorn in the side of both Marxist Angola and the Front Line States. Mobutu had refused to associate with the Front Line Presidents partly because he believed that they sought to impose a Marxist regime in Rhodesia. He argued that such a regime could deprive capitalist-oriented Zaire of access to Rhodesian coal, essential to the mines of Shaba.

The situations in Angola and Zaire profoundly affected President Kaunda. Initially, they seemed to herald an end to the obstructionist Mobutu regime while pointing up the desperate need for a return to peaceful conditions in southern Angola as a prerequisite to the reopening of the Benguela Railway. Kaunda decided to withdraw his support from UNITA and recognize Neto and his MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola. In return for this change of heart, the Soviet Union offered generous economic and military support for the beleaguered Zambian government.

Kaunda may have seriously miscalculated. The Katangan rebel invasion of Shaba was repulsed when Zaire received crucial military and logistical support from Morocco and France. Moreover, Savimbi's guerrilla movement, UNITA, grew in strength and by June

had secured much of the southern Angolan countryside. Savimbi, who felt that Kaunda had betrayed him, will probably tie up the Benguela Railway for an indefinite period and extract heavy concessions for its resumption. And, finally, in June an unsuccessful coup against Neto led by radical dissidents in his own government was seen as the most serious blow to Angola's Marxist regime since it came to power in 1975.

By September, 1977, Zambia's economy was in desperate straits. A currency devaluation had failed to reduce widespread shortages of food and material. President Kaunda, blaming his woes on bureaucratic incompetence, fired many of his most loyal and trusted aides. In doing so, he strengthened the forces of opposition in the country.

Only Nkomo's ZAPU seems to have gained from Podgorny's visit. Massive infusion of Soviet aid enabled him to increase the size of his army in Zambia and to add more sophisticated weapons at the expense of Mugabe and his ZANU forces based in Mozambique. The Soviet airline, Aeroflot, soon began to fly ZAPU recruits from Zambia to training camps in Angola staffed by Cubans and Russians. Podgorny further weakened Mugabe's position by signing a 20-year friendship treaty with Mozambique, which left open the possibility that the Soviet Union would aid Mozambique in the event of an attack from Rhodesia or South Africa. Fearing an eclipse of his power, Mugabe traveled to Peking and received assurances of increased Chinese support for his ZANU forces.

Meanwhile, Nkomo launched an intensive guerrilla recruitment drive from his bases in Zambia and Botswana. Mugabe's recruitment activity by contrast slackened. Rhodesian army surveillance of the eastern border with Mozambique increased after May, 1977, when Rhodesian scouts struck deeply into Mozambique in an attack on Mugabe's ZANU bases. Thereafter, Shona recruits from Rhodesia encountered difficulty in reaching Mugabe's camps. As a result, many passed across the less well-patrolled southern border into Botswana, where Nkomo's partisans maintain several large reception points. Nkomo's hand was further strengthened after his tour of Caribbean countries in the summer of 1977. Among his successes were Cuban

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# BOOK REVIEWS

## ON AFRICA

THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA AFRICANA DICTIONARY OF AFRICAN BIOGRAPHY, VOLUME I: ETHIOPIA-GHANA. *Directed by L. H. Ofosu-Appiah.* (New York: Reference Publications, Inc., 1977. 367 pages, bibliographies, glossaries, illustrations, maps and index, \$59.95.)

This is the first of 20 volumes to be produced by the Encyclopaedia Africana Project in Accra, Ghana. The project was originally conceived in 1909 and directed by W. E. B. Du Bois, the militant Afro-American civil rights leader. This volume contains biographies of 146 Ethiopians and 138 Ghanaians; no living persons are included. In his preface, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda writes that he sees this work as "an opportune and welcome moment for Africa to reveal the genius of her people, their history, culture and institutions, their achievements . . ."

Interesting introductory essays describing Ethiopia and Ghana help to place the biographies in historical perspective. Because the listings are alphabetical, these short preliminary essays help make the encyclopaedia informative and readable.

The writing is of excellent quality in the British tradition. There are fascinating glimpses of long-forgotten or neglected aspects of history. We learn, for example, that in 7th century Ethiopia King Armah gave asylum to persecuted Muslims; Muhammad, the founder of Islam, is said to have directed his followers, in gratitude, "to leave the Christian Abyssinians in peace."

It is always difficult to review an encyclopaedia because of the mass of unfamiliar detail; however, the carefully edited *Dictionary of African Biography* promises to make an important contribution to our knowledge of Africa, presented in a fashion to make perusing it a pleasure. O.E.S.

AFRICAN CITIES AND TOWNS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN CONQUEST. *By Richard W. Hull.* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1976. 138 pages, illustrations, maps, notes and index, \$10.95.)

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICA. *Edited by Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Walerstein.* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1976. 318 pages, \$17.50 cloth, \$7.50 paper.)

POWER AND CLASS IN AFRICA. *By Irving L.*

*Markovitz.* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977. 398 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$12.95.)

KENYA, THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION AND CONTROL. *By Henry Bienen.* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977. 215 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$3.95 paper.)

ENGLISH-SPEAKING SOUTH AFRICA TODAY. *By André De Villiers.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. 387 pages, \$17.50.)

THE HISTORY OF THE MAGHRIB. *By Abdallah Laroui, trans. by Ralph Manheim.* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977. 431 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$22.50.)

AFRICANS ABROAD. *By Graham W. Irwin.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 498 pages, notes and index, \$20.00 cloth, \$7.50 paper.)

SOUTH AFRICA IN CRISIS. *Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara.* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1977. 279 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

AFRICAN SOCIAL STUDIES; A RADICAL READER. *Edited by Peter Gutkind and Peter Waterman.* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977. 481 pages, bibliography and index, \$17.50.)

GHANA'S FIRST REPUBLIC 1960-1966. *By Trevor Jones.* (London, Eng.: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1976. 366 pages, selected bibliography and index, £ 6.50.)

MATHU OF KENYA, A POLITICAL STRUGGLE. *By Jack R. Roelker.* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976. 202 pages, notes, sources and index, \$7.95.)

TANGANYIKA AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION: A GUIDE TO PUBLICATIONS BY AND ABOUT TANU. *Compiled by John B. Howell.* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1976. 52 pages and index, available on request.)

## MISCELLANY

THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER. *Edited by Lawrence L. Whetten.* (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1977. 182 pages and index, \$14.50.)

This interesting collection of essays examines Soviet policy in various regions of the world. A.Z.R.

## NORTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 198)

that he will play a more dynamic role in sub-Saharan Africa. In May, 1977, he dispatched 1,500 troops to Zaire to assist the government of President Joseph Mobutu to dislodge a force of "mercenaries" that had invaded Shaba Province. The introduction of Moroccan troops, who helped to turn the tide, was warmly greeted by moderate black African leaders who regarded the invasion as a threat to the territorial integrity of Zaire. They believed that a successful invasion posed serious dangers for the rest of Africa. If the "mercenaries"—trained by Cuba and equipped with Soviet weapons—succeeded in toppling President Mobutu or in detaching the mineral rich Shaba area from the rest of Zaire, this might well encourage other irredentist or dissident forces interested in redrawing African boundaries.

By supporting Zaire, King Hassan demonstrated a willingness to align Morocco with moderate Africans in confronting Soviet and Cuban threats and clients. Obviously, Morocco would hope to receive support from these same moderates on the contentious issue of the Western Sahara.

## TUNISIA

For Tunisia, the problems currently confronting the government of President Habib Bourguiba are of a different order of political and economic magnitude. A secular reformer, President Bourguiba has devoted a lifetime to the liberation of Tunisia from French-rule, from Islamic institutions that impede the modernization of Tunisian society, and from a traditional oligarchy that has suffocated impulses leading to innovation and change. The *Supreme Combattant* has succeeded in transforming Tunisia, in the process broadening the base of popular participation in decisionmaking.

The primary problem confronting Tunisia is the question of political succession. President Bourguiba is in fragile health. Eventually, the mantle of authority will have to pass to one of his lieutenants, perhaps without political upheaval. In the interim, the government is operating in the shadow of the succession question, and few of the President's lieutenants are prepared to urge new initiatives in the areas of economic reform, education, trade, or the structure of the Destourian-Socialist party.

For Tunisia, this is a time for consolidation, reflection and equilibrium. Unfortunately, for her neighbors no comparable period appears to be at hand. ■

## U.S. POLICY IN AFRICA

(Continued from page 195)

But Young clearly believed that Nigeria should play an important role in the "balance of power" in Africa—a Kissingerian concept that could be readily understood

in terms of Nigeria's economic and military power. Whether Nigeria can act in such a role is not yet proved, but Young will certainly encourage this development.

As United States views of the Rhodesian settlement emerged during 1977, key elements sounded far more traditional than revolutionary: (1) the need for human rights and majority rule, to be achieved without violence;<sup>6</sup> (2) the need for reducing white resistance to change by guaranteeing compensation to whites for property rights; (3) the confidence that the economies of southern Africa would continue to be closely tied to the United States and West Europe, whoever ruled the area; and (4) the recognition of the African quest for stability, law and order. Overall, no combination of these views appeared to be acceptable to both black and white Africans.

The campaign for human rights ran into trouble when various observers demanded its application in black and white Africa. The black nations preferred to interpret human rights as a doctrine of majority rule; the whites in southern Africa then accused the United States of a double standard: why not press for human rights against Idi Amin of Uganda and Emperor Bokassa I of the Central African Empire? Indeed, the African Presidents might well have been embarrassed by the issue of human rights when it was revealed that they had imprisoned more than 1,000 members of the Namibian liberation movement, the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), on the orders of SWAPO president Sam Nujoma, simply because the dissident members were asking for free elections.

The forthright Young approach toward property rights and compensation did not particularly interest the black governments. They regarded the offer of compensation as a means of buying cooperation from the white residents in Rhodesia and possibly in Namibia. With this realistic approach, Young found a reasonably congenial negotiating environment in Rhodesia, with Premier Ian Smith. Indeed, where Kissinger had found it hard to work with Smith, and easy to work with Vorster, Young generally had the opposite experience. Most negotiations about a Rhodesian settlement involved Young, Smith, and British Foreign Minister David Owen. Smith and Owen harbored great bitterness toward one another; thus Young took the ironic position of honest broker in their talks.

Young often expressed his belief that the economies of southern Africa would always be linked to the United States. To a degree, he was expressing one of the most overlooked lessons of the Angolan civil war: if a country can continue to earn currency of universal value for its exports, it will do so. The Angolan government's need

<sup>6</sup>The nonviolent theme in Young's thought aroused much African opposition; see "U.S. Warns Radicals on South Africa," *Washington Post*, August 26, 1977—a report of Young's speech to the anti-apartheid conference held in Lagos, August, 1977.

for hard currency meant that Gulf Oil was never ejected from its Cabindan oil concession. This is a fundamental weakness of the Soviet/Cuban position in Africa. Young stated explicitly that the United States would continue to play an economic role in southern Africa, whatever the ideological complexion of the governments coming into power.

Finally, Young attracted a great deal of criticism in the United States when he indicated that Cuban troops served as a source of stability in southern Africa. Such a *realpolitik* statement generated a significant backlash, in view of the Cuban role in the liberation movements of Rhodesia and Namibia. In making his statement, however, Young tapped an important segment of African opinion, to whom the greatest challenge in the world is the creation of viable, stable regimes. In Angola, after all, the government controls only half the country. In Mozambique, well-informed observers note that the government controls only Maputo, the capital, and the major towns of the country. The threat of insurrection or invasion faces nearly all African countries intermittently. In his statement on Cuban troops in Angola, Young took an objective view of their role—Angola's government was so weak that it needed Cuban troops in order to remain in power.

The Young initiatives in Africa thus reflected a curious mixture of liberal and conservative, revolutionary and reformist views. Young was blessed, too, by the existence of conservative outside forces that could defend United States interests without forcing the United States to take action. At the time of the invasion (rebellion) in the Shaba province of Zaire, in the summer of 1977, the United States could afford not to act, because the French were willing to fly in Moroccan paratroopers and supply weapons to Zaire's government. In terms of an Angolan policy, too, the South African government's willingness to supply and train the forces of UNITA (National Union for Total Independence of Angola), opposing the Angolan government in southern Angola, allowed the Americans to stand by without taking a position on the future of Angola.

In its policy toward South Africa, however, the new administration has reversed Kissinger's policy direction and its entire African policy has reflected the shift. No longer would the United States mollify Prime Minister Vorster by avoiding pressure for change in South Africa.<sup>7</sup> Vorster's gradual alienation from the United States government, from the talks between Vorster and United States Vice President Walter Mondale in Vienna in May, 1977, to the fracas over South Africa's reported nuclear test in August, was reflected in Vorster's unwillingness to put pressure on Rhodesia's Premier Ian Smith for a settlement. The United States

shift was deliberate. Particularly in the light of the Soweto riots of 1976, which continued into 1977, apartheid could not be overlooked. Young tried to identify and communicate with other potential leaders in South African politics (Harry Oppenheimer among others), but the overall effect of his attitude was further to alienate the general public of South Africa. The Vorster government, so close to falling in the summer of 1976, used the criticism voiced by Young and Mondale to rally public opinion behind the "do-little" policies of the Nationalist government.

## CONCLUSIONS

Experimenting with new approaches to Africa, the Carter administration has undertaken a difficult task. The first year showed the inevitable mix of failure and success. Because Africa is apparently the least stable area of the world, an unorthodox foreign policy may be necessary, a foreign policy characterized by open diplomacy and an emphasis on shared moral values like human rights. ■

## CONFLICT IN THE AFRICAN HORN

(Continued from page 204)

Revolutionary party (ERP) and the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), a rightist party. Both parties were allegedly involved in an assassination attempt against Mengistu Haile Mariam and had plotted to "replace" the provisional military government and "Scientific Socialism" with non-socialist civilian rule. On February 11, 1977, Mengistu Haile Mariam succeeded Banti as Head of State; he subsequently announced his reliance on the socialist countries, notably the Soviet Union.<sup>25</sup>

On May 4, 1977, Mengistu Mariam headed an Ethiopian delegation on a four-day state visit to the Soviet Union, where the Soviet-Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed. The treaty included provisions for political, cultural, and economic ties between the two states.<sup>26</sup>

In view of actual or potential sources of conflict and radical change, the Eastern Horn presents a dismal picture. To resolve the traditional conflicts among the parties involved would seem to be impossible in the near future, especially since Ethiopia and Somalia have broken off diplomatic relations. The availability to both Ethiopia and Somalia of Soviet arms that are used with minimal restraint will lead to even greater instability in the African Horn and its surrounding area. Sudden changes in the levels of hostility between Ethiopia and Somalia, on one side, and Ethiopia and Eritrea, on the

<sup>25</sup> See *Facts on File*, vol. 37, no. 1892 (February 12, 1977), p. 98; and *Time*, February 14, 1977, p. 37.

<sup>26</sup> "Joint Soviet-Ethiopian Communiqué," *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, May 9, 1977, excerpts quoted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 29, no. 18 (June 1, 1977), p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> See "U.S. Again Links South Africa Ties to Full Black Role," *The New York Times*, July 2, 1977.

other, may involve the international community in the issues of the Eastern Horn.

It is important not only to find solutions that will relax the tensions in the area, but also to introduce measures that may enhance prospects for an equitable and durable peace. The situation demands more than restitution of the status quo ante. It is time to press for concrete arrangements, preferably through the United Nations, to resolve the problems of Africa's Eastern Horn. ■

## WHITHER EAST AFRICA?

(Continued from page 208)

Amin's foreign relations are conducted on two levels. One is designed to attract world attention and is expressed in theatrical buffoonery. Attention-getting actions include Amin's shattering public statements (like his expressed admiration for Hitler or his attack on Zionism as racism), his lightning visit to Zaire offering military help, his wishes to then-President Richard Nixon for a speedy recovery from Watergate, his offers to become the ruler of Scotland or Hawaii, or his gratuitous advice to foreign leaders. On another level, Amin looks for short-term, highly pragmatic financial and other assistance. This search has led to close relations with the Arab states, especially with Libya, which helped pay for Ugandan imports, Soviet tanks and jet planes, the loyalties of a privileged Muslim domestic minority, and various security services. Disappointment with the Palestinians during the Entebbe raid led Amin to invite Cuban technicians to train Uganda's armed forces. The alignment seems of questionable benefit, however, except as a prop for continued rule; thus Amin is increasingly isolated and faces growing domestic and foreign opposition.

The configuration of the area known as East Africa has begun to change. Hostilities have replaced earlier harmony and have shattered hopes for cooperation; and the states in the area are looking outside for economic and political ties, some of which may prove to be durable. The possibility of closer relations among the three East African states should not be dismissed, however. Idi Amin's demise and Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta's eventual passing may open fresh opportunities, which need not be incompatible with fruitful ties with countries outside East Africa. ■

## SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

(Continued from page 213)

the homeland philosophy in Namibia, given guerrilla warfare, the success of SWAPO organizational drives and political stratagems (like boycotting elections in Owambo), the disinvestment campaign overseas,<sup>23</sup> and

the constant prodding of various international organizations, including the United Nations and its various sub-organizations that deal with Namibian affairs. The time for consensus seemed to have arrived, and the Pretoria government sponsored a conference in Windhoek, Namibia's capital city, in an old German drill hall (the Turnhalle). The Turnhalle group was charged with a task of constitutional engineering to steer Namibia to independence.<sup>24</sup> The conference, which SWAPO refused to attend because the conference would not acknowledge it as the authentic representative of Namibians, consisted of delegations representing the whites as a whole, on the one hand, and all non-white ethnic groups, on the other hand. The white delegation was not further fragmented into the three language groups, and the small but highly influential German community was distressed by this intended oversight. The Germans have now formed an interest group of their own which speaks for most of the strategically located German elite.

The five Western members of the United Nations Security Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and West Germany) have kept their diplomats in Pretoria engaged in shuttle diplomacy, trying to reconcile the different perspectives of SWAPO and the Turnhalle groups so that independence may be reached by the proposed deadline, late 1978. Falling back on a legalistic interpretation of its powers in Namibia—powers not recognized by the United Nations—the South African government has taken the crucial deep-water port of Walvis Bay from Namibia. The port had been part of the Cape Province since the nineteenth century, but once the South African government assumed the role of mandatory power for the territory after conquering it from Germany, it treated Walvis Bay as though it were part and parcel of Namibia. South Africa's action with regard to Walvis Bay will diminish the economic patrimony it leaves Namibia and was hardly calculated to improve her image in the territory. Other difficult issues concern the neutralization of the territory through the withdrawal of the South African Defense Force and the holding of free and open elections in which all political groupings and returned political exiles can participate.

Although the gap between the SWAPO and Turnhalle positions is closing, with the OAU's approval of the Western diplomatic exercises, the clergymen of Namibia are also making a significant contribution in

<sup>23</sup>See Roger Murray et al., *The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia: Studies on External Investment and Black Workers' Conditions in Namibia* (n.p.: Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia [South-West Africa], 1974, distributed by Africa Publications Trust, London).

<sup>24</sup>For more extensive treatments, consult J.H.P. Serfontein, *Namibia?* (Randburg, South Africa: Fokus Suid Publishers, 1976) and Roger Murray, "Namibia's Elusive Independence: A Contest between African Nationalism and South African Interest," *Round Table* (London), no. 265 (January, 1977), pp. 42-49.



the area of racial and ethnic reconciliation. Although they have won with approval of all white and black Namibians, the labors of the Turnhalle group demonstrate that a unified, sovereign Namibia can grow out of a self-conscious attempt to share power and to seek consensus. ■

## THE DECLINE OF GHANA'S MILITARY GOVERNMENT

*(Continued from page 217)*

for example, the Ghana National Association of Teachers (not a union) negotiated for over two years with the government for the implementation of new service conditions (after a 1974 government wage increase), and rank and file teachers were finally forced to strike in late 1976, a highly unusual phenomenon. The same government agency ignored for seven months the claims of the Educational Institutions Workers Union. A mild worker demonstration led to sharp police suppression in January, 1975; 22 months later, the government department involved had still not settled these wage claims (granted to other government workers). Another strike led to numerous dismissals.

With respect to wages, the TUC made a major issue of increasing the sharply eroded wages of the lowest paid workers and reducing the income gap between the highest and the lowest paid. In 1974, when the minimum wage had dropped to 57 percent of the 1963 real wage, a significant NRC wage increase raised the minimum wage to 92 percent of the 1963 level.

However, at the same time, the NRC maintained the income gap by increasing the highest level salaries by 50 percent. Moreover, the NRC sought to impose a 5 percent limit on wage increases obtained through collective bargaining, although constant union complaints ended this practice. Massive deficit spending plus the general inflationary effects of the large oil price increases quickly reduced the real wages of the lowest paid until by mid-1976 their wages were only 50 percent of the 1963 level. A small government increase in early 1977 raised this minimum slightly, but it was not until the NRC was in the midst of the 1977 student-lawyer-doctor strike which threatened its continued rule that it announced a sharp increase in the minimum wage to prevent the workers from joining the strikers.

As a result of the NRC/SMC's political strategy, it was clear to Ghanaian workers that they were ruled by an intermittently responsive military-bureaucratic autocracy, that their leaders were alienated from them by government pressures, that their right to strike for a wage sufficient to feed themselves was abridged, and that the NRC was simply seeking to buy their acquiescence.

The NRC's economic strategy has involved strong

elements of economic nationalism, self-reliance, a priority for agriculture, and a strong state role in production and the overall direction of the economy. While several elements of this strategy of development have been successful, other elements have contributed strongly to the multifaceted economic crises that Ghana currently faces, a crisis explained only partially by two recent years of drought and by an "imported inflation" caused by increased oil and other commodity prices.

Ghana's economic nationalism has been characterized by her partial debt repudiation and her unilateral rescheduling of other debts, her attempt to "seize the commanding heights of the economy," and her self-reliance campaign, especially in agriculture. The attempt to gain greater control over the economy involved the government's determination to acquire a controlling interest in the richest mineral mines—the foreign-owned gold and diamond mines—and timber companies. This was accomplished in 1972. The NRC has also extended the indigenization campaign started by the NLC and the Busia government, whereby a number of large foreign businesses and industries have had to sell 15 percent of their ownership to the state and 40 percent to the general public through the issuance of stock.

The move away from the liberalization of trade back to import controls, along with much higher cocoa prices in 1972-1974, allowed Ghana to acquire balance of trade surpluses but also led to shortages. Huge new imports in 1974 led the NRC to tighten controls again in order to forestall a serious balance of payments crisis, and this action in turn led to shortages of all kinds, especially in spare parts, agricultural inputs (fertilizers, insecticides), and raw materials for industrial production (62 percent of which, on the average, are imported). Thus, while Ghana again had a small balance of payments surplus in 1975, it was at the cost of sharply reduced industrial production; many factories and sawmills either stopped production completely or operated at a sharply reduced level.

The NRC's determination to induce growth in the economy made it reject deflationary policies and finance the projected growth through deficit budgets (it printed money). There was virtually no growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in 1972, 2.8 percent in 1973, and 6.5 percent in 1974 (or 5.7 percent and 8.1 percent, respectively, adjusted for terms of trade). The effects of huge oil price increases, generalized inflation on imported goods, and the worldwide recession contributed to sharp constraints on foreign exchange earnings and problems in allocating them, which contributed to flat GDP growth in both 1975 and 1976. Nonetheless, the government's deficit budgets gave rise to increases in the money supply, 23 percent in 1973, 25 percent in 1974, and 36.6 percent in 1975, contributing, with the other factors, to an unparalleled inflation in Ghana, where prices rose 67 percent in 1976.

The single most important component of this inflation was local food prices, up 88.5 percent in 1976, an inescapable indictment of the failure of the government's Operation Feed Yourself (OFY) and Feed Your Industries program and its agricultural strategy as a whole. The government, the Agricultural Development Bank, and other banks and business firms made massive investments in agriculture. A partial explanation is the fact that a large proportion of the investments in agriculture went into capital intensive agricultural inputs, which were then made available to large farmers with sufficient land and credit backing to make these investments. This was especially true of rice production in the north. Small farmers, with less land and capital, were much harder to reach and to organize, though the government now has a major program under way, supported by the United States Agency for International Development (AID), for smaller farmers, where relatively slight increases in credit and fertilizer inputs may result in significantly increased production. The lack of organization and representation of the small farmers, and the desire of the NRC, like previous governments, to undertake massive ventures that would change conditions dramatically have also encouraged the NRC to undertake grandiose, expensive schemes that the government has demonstrated little capacity to implement. Indeed, disorganization has reached sublime proportions, with fertilizer sitting on the docks while farmers plant without it. The government has not even been able to ensure a supply of machetes to farmers. The SMC has consistently ignored statistics showing that small fishermen with inexpensive motorized canoes provide much more fish than the State Fishing Corporation, with its expensive trawlers.

Although the Operation Feed Yourself program registered singular successes by 1974, with increased production in five staple crops—yams, cassava, plantains, maize, and rice—both acreage and production in all but rice have declined since 1974. The government has launched several wage labor schemes to get unemployed school leavers into agriculture, but these projects have yet to register any success. The new high cocoa prices on the world market have also been of insufficient benefit, because Ghana's cocoa production has declined sharply in recent years. And despite four increases in the price paid to cocoa farmers, the still higher prices available in surrounding territories have led to a high level of smuggling. The overvaluation of the Ghanaian currency also contributes to massive smuggling and thus creates shortages in Ghana.

The continuous shortages in imported and local products during 1976-1977 have led the SMC from one desperate expedient to another, mounting military operations on marketplaces to uncover hoarders and black marketeers, establishing state agencies to undertake bulk import purchasing and distribution to retailers and regions to ensure the availability of essential

commodities, organizing flour distribution so that it reaches bakers (whose loaves of bread steadily diminish in size), and, finally, in 1976, forbidding the numerous market women, backbone of the distribution system, to trade in selected imported commodities that would be on sale thereafter only in supermarkets. This policy, which exacerbated hoarding and shortages, ended in July, 1977; thereafter huge supplies of hoarded commodities miraculously reappeared on sale by market women at sharply increased prices.

In July, 1977, the government also adopted a new liberal import policy to remove constraints on production. But there is no evidence that it will not lead fairly quickly to a new balance of payments crisis. The relaxation of price controls has already led to sharply increased prices on local foods and imported goods. The government's 1977-1978 budget forecasts sharply increased expenditures and a deficit of 25 percent of the total budget, which will undoubtedly feed inflation.

### THE STRUGGLE OVER CIVILIAN RULE

Responding to continuing pressures in October, 1976, General Acheampong rejected plans for civilian rule based on political party government "that brings in its trail division, hatred, sectional and tribal interests." He advocated a form of "union government," in which all Ghanaians would be united, and suggested that Ghanaians comment on the subject. In the following weeks, military leaders toured the country, arguing that the SMC had said "no" to party politics—a totally foreign concept "which breaks up homes and generates physical violence and struggle"—and stating that a government based on national unity would endure, would represent "one nation, one people," and would do away with tribalism. The notion of "union government" remained extremely vague, but it clearly excluded organized political competition for office and just as clearly involved the continued participation of the military in political life. Chiefs started to speak up in favor of union government, because party competition had previously divided communities and had led to conflict over chiefs, whom governments had removed and reinstalled virtually at will. In January, 1977, Acheampong announced the formation of an ad hoc committee of 14 people, headed by the Attorney General and including people close to the SMC, to hear the views of Ghanaians on union government.

A few voices accused the SMC of using the union government idea in order to perpetuate itself in office (it still refused to offer a date for ending military rule). However, a no-party government has a powerful positive appeal to Ghanaians. Many political parties and party factions have tended to reflect ethnic and regional alliances, exacerbating ethnic conflict. When a return to civilian rule was first discussed in 1967-1969, many Ghanaians were interested in a no-party government.

Although many individuals and groups spoke out for

union government, there were strong dissident voices, and some supporters had very specific ideas for its composition. The TUC, for instance, supported "union government," but wanted an elective National Assembly, interim representation for all important groups, and a mass socialist movement. University students initially gave enthusiastic backing to the NRC/SMC and its nationalist measures, joined in voluntary work to help production and welcomed the national service scheme by which students would work at reduced rates for the government for a year. But the NRC had twice closed down universities, when the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) was critical and mounted demonstrations. NUGS thus called for "a one-party socialist political system based on equality, justice, and democracy." The Bar Association, many of whose members had been strong supporters or participants in the Busia government and had opposed the use of military tribunals, denounced the ad hoc committee as "a sham" and a "waste of public funds" and repeated its demand, first made in 1976, for the restoration of civilian rule by 1978. The Bar Association supported party competition, because this united people around programs, not tribes. More conservative groups also expressed doubts: an old Ashanti association suggested that other forms of rule should also be discussed, and the Christian Council proposed a "national government" that would exclude the army, the police and civil servants.

In the midst of this ongoing debate, when students at the University of Ghana demonstrated against the poor food, the SMC closed down the university for a third time and said that the students would be redeployed to grow food. Some students demonstrated for the resignation of the SMC; some demonstrators were arrested; others traveled to secondary and technical schools to encourage students to join them in demonstrations. The Ghana Medical Association then went on a three-day strike, demanding the opening of the universities. The government subsequently relented and said that senior students could return to take their examinations, but NUGS declared that no students would return unless all could return. In early June, the SMC undertook a wholesale purge, removing from office the Chief Justice and the two medical heads of Korle Bu Hospital in Accra as well as the heads of various corporations and financial institutions. For the first time, civilians were appointed to Cabinet positions. The compulsory retirements without any explanation were viewed as acts of victimization, and the Bar Association and the Medical Association again called their members out on strike. Within a week, the professional organizations representing lawyers, doctors, engineers, bankers, chartered accountants, veterinarians, and surveyors issued ultimatums to the government: they would strike unless the government resigned by July 1. On July 1, for the first time, Acheampong produced a timetable for a

return to civilian rule, including the convening of a constituent assembly, though no date for its convening was established. The professional bodies launched a 19-day strike, in the course of which there were negotiations between the government and the Professional Bodies Association. On July 13, Acheampong announced that civilian rule would return on July 1, 1979, and that elections could be supervised by an international tribunal.

The failure of the SMC to permit broad sectors of the politically conscious Ghanaian public to participate in key economic and political decisions and institutions systematically undermined its capacity to implement those reforms it genuinely sought and to elicit full public compliance with its policies. Although the SMC still supports the "no party" concept of union government—on which it plans a referendum before a constituent assembly meets—the future form of civilian rule in Ghana is far from settled. ■

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## RHODESIA AND HER NEIGHBORS

*(Continued from page 222)*

assurances of aid and a long talk with chief United States Representative to the United Nations Andrew Young, at a time when the United States House of Representatives voted to exclude Mozambique and Angola from United States aid.

At the fourteenth annual OAU Conference in July, Kaunda and the other Front Line Presidents were able to persuade the 49-nation organization to recognize the Patriotic Front as the sole legitimate black nationalist movement for the liberation of Rhodesia, another bid by the Front Line States to achieve unity in the liberation struggle. Kaunda warned that an OAU failure to support the Patriotic Front could plunge a black-ruled Rhodesia into civil war. In other words, if the ZANU and ZAPU were not recognized as a single unit within the Patriotic Front framework they would eventually fight each other for power in an Angolan-style civil war. Yet Kaunda's enthusiastic support of Nkomo's ZAPU appeared to create uneasiness within the ranks of ZANU. Moreover, Muzorewa, who had failed to win United States support on a visit to Washington, D.C., in April, felt betrayed and formed his own United African National Council (UANC) in Rhodesia. However, the bishop's unwillingness to join with Sithole caused a defection of some of his most trusted aides.

In mid-August, United States President Jimmy Carter called Nyerere to Washington, D.C., in preparation for another Anglo-American attempt to put Rhodesian negotiations back on the track before the Soviet Union could steal the show. The Nyerere-Carter talks reflected United States interest in seeking a settlement on terms acceptable to the Front Line States. But

*(Continued on page 240)*

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A Current History chronology covering the most important events of October, 1977, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

### Arms Control

- Oct. 3—United States, British and Soviet negotiators begin meetings in Geneva to discuss a treaty banning all types of nuclear testing, including underground blasts.
- Oct. 26—In a joint statement issued in Geneva, U.S. and Soviet negotiators say that talks aimed at barring the development of radiological and other weapons capable of this sort of mass destruction have recessed.

### Belgrade Conference

- Oct. 4—Representatives from 33 European countries, the U.S. and Canada meet in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to review the 1975 Helsinki accords.

### European Common Market (EEC)

- Oct. 8—Meeting in Brussels with EEC Minister for Energy Guido Brunner, U.S. Energy Secretary James Schlesinger says that the U.S. will continue to provide "a reliable source of enriched uranium" for the members of the European Common Market.

### International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference

- Oct. 19—U.S. President Jimmy Carter addresses the opening session of a 3-day, 38-nation International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference in Washington, D.C.; he calls for a nuclear fuel bank to provide "a reservoir of fuel" in case of temporary shortages of enriched uranium.

### International Terrorism

- Oct. 2—In Dacca, Bangladesh, 5 Japanese Red Army terrorists, who are still holding 139 hostages aboard a Japan Air Lines jet plane, exchange some hostages in return for \$6 million and 6 radical comrades who were released from prison in Japan and flown to Dacca at the terrorists' request.
- Oct. 3—The Japanese Red Army terrorists free the remaining 19 of their 151 original hostages in Algiers; with the 6 freed terrorists, they surrender to Algerian authorities.
- Oct. 13—A German Lufthansa Boeing 737 airliner is hijacked by armed gunmen and diverted to Cyprus after leaving Majorca; the hijackers are demanding the release of 11 Red Army guerrillas in German prisons in return for the lives of the hostages on board the plane.
- Oct. 15—The hijacked German airliner reaches Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Negotiations between hijackers and the German government continue.

Another group of terrorists threatens to kill kidnapped German industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer (kidnapped on September 5).

- Oct. 17—The German government refuses to meet the hijackers' demands, and the captured plane is flown to Aden, South Yemen; South Yemen refuses to allow the plane to remain.

The hijacked plane lands in Mogadishu, Somalia, its sixth stop; the body of the pilot, Jürgen Schumann, is dumped from the plane shortly after landing.

90 minutes before a new deadline set by the terrorists, a West German commando unit blasts its way into the hijacked plane, kills 3 terrorists, wounds a fourth and rescues 86 hostages.

- Oct. 18—3 West German terrorist leaders, Andreas Baader, Jan-Carl Raspe, and Gudrun Ensslin, commit suicide in their cells; a 4th, Irmgard Möller, wounds herself in a similar attempt.

- Oct. 19—The body of kidnapped West German industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer is found in Mulhouse, France.

### Middle East

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Oct. 1—U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in New York and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Moscow issue a joint statement declaring that a Middle East peace conference should insure "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people"; it also calls for the establishment of "normal peaceful relations" in the Middle East.
- Oct. 5—After 3 hours of talks in New York between U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, a joint statement is issued agreeing that U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 will "remain the basis for resumption of Geneva and that all understandings and agreements between them on this subject remain in force."
- Oct. 10—In an address to the U.N. General Assembly, Dayan lists 4 "essential" points for a Middle East peace settlement, including guarantees of Israel's security and of the "full coexistence" of Israelis and Palestinian Arabs in the Gaza Strip and on the Jordan River's West Bank.
- Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam says that "Syria will never go to Geneva without the PLO."
- Oct. 22—The PLO's Executive Committee, meeting in Beirut, Lebanon, rejects U.S.-Israeli proposals for a resumption of the Geneva conference because the Palestinian position is being neglected.

### North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

- Oct. 11—U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown meets in Bari, Italy, with members of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group and urges them to back the U.S. development of the neutron bomb, which could be used in the event of ground warfare in Europe.
- Oct. 12—At the conclusion of a 2-day meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group in Italy, European members express concern that the range of the U.S. cruise missile will be limited in U.S.-Soviet strategic arms talks and agree that political considerations make it impossible to decide on the possible deployment of a neutron bomb in Europe.

### Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

- Oct. 7—The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries signs agreements lending a total of \$50.9 million to 12 developing countries; Pakistan will receive the largest of the interest-free loans, \$11 million.



Oct. 12—Meeting with Nigerian Head of State Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo in Washington, D.C., U.S. President Jimmy Carter asks his help to hold down oil prices; Nigeria is a member of OPEC and a major source of U.S. oil.

#### United Nations

Oct. 5—At the U.N. in New York, U.S. President Jimmy Carter signs 2 covenants on human rights, one dealing with civil rights and the other with economic and social rights; the U.S. has delayed signing the covenants for 11 years.

Oct. 12—Addressing a United Nations subcommittee, Swedish Minister for International Development Ola Ullsten says that Sweden is cancelling more than \$200 million in debts owed to Sweden by 8 poor third world countries.

Oct. 18—Addressing the U.N. General Assembly, Sam Nujoma, leader of the South-West Africa People's Organization, asks for U.N. economic and military sanctions against South Africa if South Africa does not withdraw her military forces from Namibia (South-West Africa).

Oct. 21—The Security Council approves a 1-year extension of the U.N. peacekeeping force in the Sinai.

Oct. 24—The United Nations General Assembly adopts a new scale of assessments; in general, the assessments of industrialized Western countries are to be increased.

Oct. 28—With Israel opposed and the U.S. and 6 others abstaining, the General Assembly adopts a resolution censuring Israel for the establishment of settlements in occupied Arab lands.

Newly appointed U.N. envoy to Rhodesia General Prem Chand arrives in Lusaka, Zambia, to discuss the military aspects of a Rhodesian peace plan.

Oct. 31—The U.S., Britain, and France use their Security Council vetoes to block 3 resolutions sponsored by black African nations to impose strict economic sanctions on South Africa.

#### ARGENTINA

Oct. 1—General Roberto Viola, army chief of staff, claims that since the army took power 18 months ago the government has killed or jailed 80 percent of the leftist guerrillas.

#### BANGLADESH

Oct. 2—An attempted military coup is thwarted; 11 senior air force officers are killed.

Oct. 14—President Ziaur Rahman outlaws 3 political parties for alleged involvement in the attempted October 2 coup: the centrist Democratic League, headed by former President Khandakar Mushtaq Ahmed, the National Socialist party and the Bangladesh Communist party.

Oct. 19—The government executes 37 members of the armed forces for their role in the October 2 attempted coup; 460 people have been tried by a military tribunal; 63 have been acquitted.

Oct. 27—55 soldiers are sentenced to death by a military court for their role in an unsuccessful revolt September 30. To date, 92 people are under death sentence for their part in that revolt.

#### BRAZIL

Oct. 12—General Sylvio Couto Coelho da Frota, one of 2 people regarded as a possible successor to President Ernesto Geisel in 1979, is dismissed from his post as Army Minister.

#### CANADA

(See also U.S., Legislation)

Oct. 14—In Ottawa, Queen Elizabeth II and her husband, Prince Philip, arrive for a 6-day visit.

Oct. 19—In an attempt to relieve the high rate of unemployment, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau announces an additional \$150-million government-sponsored job program.

Oct. 28—After 82 days as a prisoner, Charles Marion is released by his kidnappers after a \$50,000 ransom is paid.

#### CHINA

Oct. 7—Tass, the Soviet press agency, reports that after 8 years of talks a Soviet-Chinese navigation commission has reached an agreement on shipping rights on the Ussuri River.

Oct. 8—It is reported in Hong Kong that the Communist party's Central Committee has announced wage increases for factory workers and low-level teachers and government officials (approximately 50 to 60 percent of the urban workers); the increases will be between 15 and 20 percent of the current wages and are the first raises since the 1950's.

Oct. 21—Hsinhua, the official press agency, announces that in a reversal of Maoist policy, students applying to universities must take entrance examinations.

#### CUBA

Oct. 3—For the first time in 17 years, a Cuban Cabinet member, Minister for Foreign Trade Marcelo Fernández Font, meets with U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C.

Oct. 16—Prime Minister Fidel Castro arrives in Kingston, Jamaica, for a 5-day visit, his first to Jamaica.

#### CYPRUS

Oct. 25—In an infrequent press conference in Athens, Greek Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis criticizes the U.S. for not putting pressure on Turkey to negotiate on Cyprus. He says the U.S. is afraid of losing its military bases in Turkey.

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Oct. 18—In Prague, 2 signatories of the Charter 77 manifesto are sentenced to prison terms for subversive activities; 2 others (playwright Vaclav Havel and theater director Frantisek Pavlicek) are given suspended sentences.

#### EGYPT

(See also U.S., Foreign Policy)

Oct. 24—In Cairo, the Sudanese and Egyptian Parliaments begin a week-long joint session; President Anwar Sadat refers to the session as a "unified conference of the Nile Valley."

#### ETHIOPIA

Oct. 24—The Western Somalia Liberation Front reports that 44 Ethiopian soldiers have been killed in recent fighting in the Ogaden region.

#### FRANCE

Oct. 16—In Teheran, Economy and Finance Minister Robert Boulin signs an agreement with the Iranian government according to which France will finance the construction of two 900-megawatt nuclear power plants in Iran and will provide a 10-year supply of enriched uranium fuel.

**GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)**(See also *Intl, Intl Terrorism*)

- Oct. 5—The governments of East and West Germany agree to begin formal negotiations on normalizing border traffic between the 2 countries.
- Oct. 25—At a funeral service honoring the murdered industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer, President Walter Scheel appeals to the world's leaders to try to end the terrorism that threatens "to spread like a brush fire all over the world."

**GREECE**(See also *Cyprus*)

- Oct. 21—Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis dismisses 3 Cabinet officials; 19 of 21 undersecretaries of state resign to make way for a caretaker government that will administer the November 20 elections.

**INDIA**(See also *Bangladesh*)

- Oct. 3—Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is arrested on charges of corruption and is taken into custody.
- Oct. 4—Gandhi is released from prison on the order of a magistrate who claims the police did not present a strong enough preliminary case against her.
- Oct. 15—Gandhi fails in her attempt to win the Congress party presidency. Nonetheless, the Congress party votes to reaffirm its support of Gandhi and her former ministers, who have been indicted by the government on charges of corruption.
- Oct. 27—On his return to New Delhi from a 6-day goodwill mission in Moscow, Prime Minister Morarji Desai says that there "is a complete identity of views" between the two governments on India's foreign policy.

**ISRAEL**(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Oct. 10—Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Zippori announces the Cabinet's approval of 6 and possibly 7 new settlements in the occupied area of the West Bank of the Jordan River.
- Oct. 11—The Cabinet approves the terms of a "working paper" worked out in Washington, D.C., by Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and U.S. President Jimmy Carter on the procedures for a Middle East conference in Geneva. The terms of the agreement are not made public.
- Oct. 13—In a surprise move, Foreign Minister Dayan makes public the terms of the agreement reached with President Carter on the procedures for the Middle East conference.
- Oct. 19—The Democratic Movement for Change, headed by Yigael Yadin, votes to join the Likud-led coalition government of Prime Minister Menahem Begin.
- Oct. 24—4 new members are appointed to the Cabinet; they are all members of the Democratic Movement for Change.
- Oct. 28—In a nationally televised speech, Finance Minister Simha Ehrlich announces a relaxation of currency controls that will allow the pound to float. At present, the exchange rate for the U.S. dollar is 10.36 pounds; under the new policy, the exchange rate will be approximately 15 pounds to the dollar.
- Oct. 30—Finance Minister Ehrlich asks the unions to "re-act with restraint and consideration" to the government's attempt to establish a free market economy. Subsidies on 150 basic commodities are eliminated and an 8 to 12 percent increase in the value added tax is levied. The cost of living is expected to rise 10 percent.

**JAPAN**

- Oct. 3—Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda announces a government plan to stimulate the economy by spending an additional \$7.6 billion in fiscal year 1977-1978.
- Oct. 6—It is reported that last week France agreed to reprocess Japan's spent nuclear fuel to produce plutonium for Japan when the French plant at La Hague opens in 1985. U.S. President Carter has opposed the processing of plutonium because it is used in nuclear explosives.

**KENYA**

- Oct. 31—Airline traffic between Kenya and Tanzania is halted, closing the last direct travel route between the 2 countries.

**KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)**(See *U.S., Political Scandal*)**LEBANON**(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Oct. 13—Violations of the September cease-fire continue in southern Lebanon near the Israeli border. The arrival of Lebanese army troops is delayed because of the fighting.
- Oct. 30—In Beirut, Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam and two other high-ranking Syrian officials meet with President Elias Sarkis in an attempt to work out an effective cease-fire for southern Lebanon.

**MEXICO**(See also *U.S., Legislation*)

- Oct. 8—*The New York Times* reports that former Minister of Agrarian Reform Félix Barra Garcia was arrested on September 23 on charges of corruption during his Cabinet term.

**MOROCCO**

- Oct. 10—Prime Minister Ahmed Osman officially presents his 30-member Cabinet to King Hassan II.

**NAMIBIA (South-West Africa)**(See *Intl, U.N.*)**NETHERLANDS**(See also *Intl, International Terrorism*)

- Oct. 25—5 months after the general election, the Labor party, the Christian Democrats and the Democrats '66 reach an agreement on the distribution of seats in the center-left Cabinet. Labor party leader Joop Den Uyl is the Prime Minister; the Christian Democrats will continue to head the Justice Ministry.

**NICARAGUA**

- Oct. 20—Fighting breaks out between government troops and leftist guerrillas north of Managua. The Sandinista National Liberation Front denies official reports that it is attempting to overthrow the government of President Anastasio Somoza Debayle.

**NIGERIA**(See also *Intl, OPEC*)

- Oct. 1—In an attempt to stem the flow of foreign currency out of the country, Head of State Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo announces new currency regulations.

**PAKISTAN**(See also *Intl, OPEC*)

Oct. 1—General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq extends martial law indefinitely and cancels the elections set for October 18. He says the criminal cases against former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his aides should be decided before elections are held.

Oct. 11—Bhutto and 4 members of the Federal Security Force are formally charged with conspiring to murder a political opponent, Ahmed Raza Kasuri.

### PANAMA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 23—A national referendum is held to decide whether to approve the recently signed Panama Canal treaties with the United States.

Oct. 28—Final returns show that voters favor the canal treaties by a 2-to-1 margin.

### PHILIPPINES

Oct. 11—On Jolo Island off Mindanao, Brigadier General Teodulfo Bautista, 5 of his aides, and 28 soldiers are killed while they are on a peace mission by Muslim guerrillas.

Oct. 26—On Mindanao, government troops, supported by aircraft and naval guns, are repelled by rebel forces when they try to storm a rebel stronghold.

Oct. 31—President Ferdinand Marcos, in order to allow free debate prior to a December 17 referendum on his presidency, eases martial law restrictions that were first proclaimed in 1972.

### RHODESIA

(See also *Intl, United Nations*)

Oct. 1—It is reported that Prime Minister Ian Smith met secretly with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia on September 25.

### SOMALIA

(See *Ethiopia*)

### SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Intl, U.N.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 3—In Johannesburg, Bantu Affairs Minister M. C. Botha announces that he will not seek reelection in November.

Oct. 7—At the request of Justice Minister James T. Kruger, the Press Council meets in emergency session; it votes to limit *The Rand Daily Mail's* coverage of the death of Stephen Biko. *The Daily Mail* printed stories that conflicted with the government's version of Biko's death.

Oct. 19—The government begins a crackdown on so-called black agitators by prohibiting publication of the principal black newspapers, *The World* and *Weekend World*, arresting their editors, Percy Qoboza and Aggrey Klaaste, forbidding Donald J. Woods of the *East London Daily Dispatch* to publish, and banning black protest groups, among them the Black Consciousness movement and the Christian Institute of Southern Africa. 50 people are arrested and an unknown number are banned (placed under house arrest) for 5 years.

Oct. 22—In a joint statement, 19 editors in chief of the leading English-language newspapers tell the government that its policy toward black publications will not intimidate them.

Oct. 23—Justice Minister Kruger announces that the bans on 18 anti-apartheid organizations will be permanent.

Oct. 26—Defense Minister Pieter W. Botha claims that U.S. support of a U.N. arms embargo would not weaken

the country's overall military capabilities. He claims South Africa is "self-sufficient enough . . . to fight any non-conventional war . . . and can sustain anything of a conventional nature . . . on a limited scale."

Oct. 27—An official inquest into the cause of the death of Stephen Biko begins.

### SPAIN

Oct. 8—In Guernica, president of the council of the Basque Province of Vizcaya August Uncena Barraneche and 2 of his bodyguards are murdered.

Oct. 9—The Basque separatist organization (ETA) claims responsibility for killing Uncena and his bodyguards.

### SRI LANKA

Oct. 5—The National Assembly approves a constitutional amendment that provides for a French-style parliamentary system. Under the amendment, Prime Minister J. R. Jayewardene will become President in January, 1978, with full executive powers.

Oct. 20—The Speaker of Parliament signs into law the constitutional amendment that alters the form of government.

### SUDAN

(See *Egypt*)

### SWEDEN

(See *Intl, U.N.*)

### SYRIA

(See *Intl, Middle East; United Arab Emirates*)

### THAILAND

Oct. 20—In a bloodless coup, the military junta deposes the conservative civilian government of Prime Minister Thanin Kraivichien; Defense Minister Sa-ngad Chaloryu is named head of the revolutionary party that will administer the country until elections next year.

### TURKEY

(See *Cyprus*)

### U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Arms Control, Middle East; China; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 3—Konstantin V. Chernenko, a close associate of President Leonid Brezhnev's, and Vasily V. Kuznetsov, the 1st Deputy Foreign Minister, are appointed to the Politburo as nonvoting members.

Oct. 7—The Supreme Court unanimously approves the new constitution, the draft of which was made public in June.

Kuznetsov is appointed to the newly created post of 1st Vice President.

Oct. 10—Tass, the government press agency, reports that the Soyuz 25 space capsule failed to dock with an orbital station. Soyuz 25, launched yesterday, returns to earth.

Oct. 14—In an open letter to the 35 countries participating in the Belgrade conference on European cooperation and security, more than 100 Soviet Jewish activists accuse the government of violating the Helsinki accords by attempting to eradicate Jewish culture in the Soviet Union.

Oct. 28—U.S. intelligence officials report that the Soviet Union is constructing a 500-foot-long nuclear submarine called the Typhoon that is capable of launching 20 to 24 long-range ballistic missiles. The Typhoon is the largest submarine ever built by the Soviet Union.

### UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Oct. 25—In Abu Dhabi, Minister of State Saif ibn Said

al-Ghubash is shot and killed by gunmen. It is believed that Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam was the intended victim.

## UNITED KINGDOM

### Great Britain

- Oct. 4—The Treasury reports that foreign currency reserves increased during September to a total of \$17.7 billion, 4 times the level of December, 1976.
- Oct. 14—Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip arrive in Ottawa, Canada, to begin a 6-day visit in celebration of the Queen's Silver Jubilee.
- Oct. 20—Queen Elizabeth addresses the opening session of Parliament in the Bahamas.
- Oct. 31—The British Treasury permits the pound to find its own level on world markets; it rises more than 6c to U.S. \$1.84 = £ 1.

## UNITED STATES

### Administration

(See also *Supreme Court*)

- Oct. 2—Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger says that if Congress fails to adopt President Carter's proposed tax on domestically produced oil, \$15 billion in duties could be imposed on imported oil without congressional approval under the Trade Adjustment Act; in either case, the price of petroleum products would rise about 7 cents per gallon.
- Oct. 4—Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall announces plans to enforce the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which imposes federal standards on 470,000 private pension plans.
- Oct. 13—At a White House news conference, President Carter says the nation's oil companies are not interested in solving the nation's energy problems and intend to take full advantage of an "impending energy crisis" in "the biggest rip-off in history."
- Oct. 17—The Food and Drug Administration announces that starting October 18 pharmaceutical companies manufacturing estrogen must provide a warning that women receiving the drug run increased risks of cancer and gall bladder diseases.
- Oct. 19—After 19 months, the Anglo-French Concorde supersonic airplane finally makes its 1st flight to Kennedy International Airport in New York.
- Oct. 31—In U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., former director of the Central Intelligence Agency Richard Helms pleads nolo contendere (no contest) to 2 misdemeanor counts for not testifying "fully, completely and accurately" before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1973.

### Civil Rights

(See also *Supreme Court*)

- Oct. 7—Federal District Judge A. Andrew Hauk declares that the racial quota section of the Federal Public Works Employment Act of May, 1977, is "invidious and unconstitutional"; under the act, 10 percent of some government construction spending has been reserved for companies owned by racial minorities.
- Oct. 12—After 12 years of negotiation, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Chicago Board of Education agree on a city-wide plan for desegregating Chicago's public schools.

### Economy

- Oct. 6—The Labor Department reports that the wholesale price index rose 0.5 percent in September.

- Oct. 7—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate fell to 6.9 percent in September.

Most of the country's largest banks raise the prime interest rate from 7¼ to 7½ percent.

- Oct. 21—The Labor Department reports that the consumer price index rose 0.3 percent in September, up 6.6 percent from September, 1976.
- Oct. 26—The Bethlehem Steel Corporation reports a record net loss of \$477 million for the 3d quarter, the largest loss ever reported by a U.S. company for a single quarter.
- Oct. 27—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. trade balance for September improved to show a deficit of only \$1.7 billion.
- Oct. 28—The Commerce Department says that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.3 percent in September.

### Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Arms Control, Belgrade Conference, EEC, Middle East, NATO, OPEC, U.N.; Cuba; Cyprus; Panama*)

- Oct. 3—State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d reports that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have concluded a week-long discussion aimed at preventing an arms race in the Indian Ocean.
- Oct. 4—President Carter addresses the United Nations General Assembly in New York; he asks all nations to curb the arms race and says that on a "reciprocal basis we are willing now to reduce [our nuclear weapons] by . . . 50 percent."
- President Carter meets with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan in separate sessions in New York to find a possible formula for a new Middle East peace conference in Geneva.
- Oct. 5—In New York, President Carter meets with Lebanese Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros to discuss Middle East peace and the latest cease-fire in Lebanon.
- Oct. 14—After a meeting in the White House between Panamanian leader Brigadier General Omar Torrijos Herrera and President Carter, a joint "statement of understanding" is issued that affirms the right of the U.S. "to act against any aggression or threat directed against the [Panama] Canal."
- Oct. 18—Officials in the Department of Energy offer a plan under which the U.S. would be responsible for the storage and disposal of atomic wastes from atomic reactors in foreign countries as well as in the U.S.
- Oct. 27—Answering questions at his Washington, D.C., press conference, President Carter says the U.S. would support mandatory U.N. sanctions against arms sales to South Africa; the U.S. has supported a voluntary ban since 1963.
- Oct. 29—In a note made public today and sent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on October 19, the U.S. embassy in Moscow protests the attempted blackmail of U.S. diplomat, Constantine Warvariv, by a Soviet secret police agent.

### Labor and Industry

- Oct. 5—Meeting in Detroit, the executive board of the United Auto Workers (UAW) decides not to convene a UAW convention to consider the reaffiliation of the UAW with the AFL-CIO, which it left in 1958.

### Legislation

- Oct. 4—After more than 2 weeks of filibustering and delay-



ing tactics, the Senate votes 50 to 46 to deregulate the price of newly discovered natural gas.

President Carter signs a \$69.3-billion appropriation for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Veterans Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Science Foundation, the Treasury Department's Office of Revenue Sharing and some other smaller agencies.

The House votes 394 to 26 to approve a \$14.7-billion housing bill, approved by a Senate-House conference; the Senate previously approved the bill, which now goes to President Carter.

Oct. 8—President Carter signs a bill requiring a case-by-case review of eligibility for Veterans Administration benefits of the approximately 16,000 veterans who took advantage of the special discharge and review program to upgrade their less than honorable discharges from the armed services.

Oct. 12—President Carter signs a \$14.7 billion housing bill that will expand the federal community development program and provide increased aid to older cities and rent subsidies for poor families.

Oct. 13—The House votes 402 to 5 and the Senate approves by voice vote a bill creating agencies to monitor and track down fraud in Medicare and Medicaid programs.

Oct. 18—President Carter signs a bill that will provide an extra \$54,000 a year for staff aides to former President Gerald Ford until January 20, 1980; his regular allowance for staff is \$96,000.

A House-Senate conference begins meeting to work out a compromise on the conflicting energy bills passed by the House and Senate.

Oct. 20—By a voice vote in the Senate and a House vote of 366 to 52, Congress passes a \$6.1 billion authorization bill for the Energy Research and Development Administration, which includes \$80 million to keep the Clinch River, Tennessee, nuclear reactor project operating.

The House votes 236 to 187 to approve legislation raising the current minimum wage from \$2.30 an hour to \$2.65 in January, 1978, and by yearly increments to \$3.35 in January, 1981; the Senate passed the bill by a voice vote on October 19.

Oct. 27—At a news conference in Washington, D.C., President Carter says that he will not introduce his new tax legislation until after Congress acts on his energy and social security programs.

Oct. 28—President Carter signs the bill that permits U.S. citizens in Mexican and Canadian jails to be transferred to U.S. prisons for the balance of their sentences at the prisoners' requests; the measure is reciprocal for Mexican and Canadian nationals.

President Carter signs a bill giving permanent legal resident status to some 145,000 Indochinese refugees who have been in the U.S. for 2 years; after 5 more years they can apply for citizenship.

## Military

Oct. 4—Defense Department spokesmen say that the special 6-month program to review less-than-honorable Vietnam war discharges will end tomorrow; about 16,227 discharges have been upgraded.

Oct. 5—Defense Secretary Harold Brown approves development funds for a new mobile missile system including a missile that can be launched at any one of several points from a 10- to 12-mile tunnel.

Oct. 27—The Defense Department says that on October 25 the Soviet Union staged a 3d successful test of a newly

developed weapon that destroyed a target satellite.

## Political Scandal

Oct. 4—U.S. district court Judge John Sirica reduces the sentences of Watergate conspirators John Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman from between 30 months and 8 years to "not less than one year, nor more than four years." Mitchell and Haldeman will be eligible for parole in June, 1978, and Ehrlichman, who is serving a second sentence, will be eligible for parole in March, 1979.

Oct. 14—Former Representative Richard Hanna (D., Cal.) is indicted by a federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., on 40 felony charges as a result of an investigation of alleged bribery and influence-peddling on the part of South Korean Tongsun Park; Hanna is charged with attempting to manipulate the actions of the U.S. government and with fraud because of his involvement with Tongsun Park.

Oct. 25—The Justice Department says that the South Korean government has refused to allow its investigators in Seoul, Korea, to question Tongsun Park on the subject of Korean bribery of U.S. officials.

## Science and Space

Oct. 12—The space shuttle, Enterprise, executes the 1st landing at Edwards Air Force Base, California, that exactly simulates a landing after a trip from space.

## Supreme Court

Oct. 3—The Supreme Court opens its 1977-1978 term in Washington, D.C.

The Supreme Court unanimously agrees to dismiss an appeal from a lower court decision that upheld the constitutionality of New York City's Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC).

Oct. 12—The Court starts to hear arguments in the case of *University of California v. Allan Bakke*, which involves the constitutionality of preferential treatment of minorities in university graduate school admissions.

Oct. 17—The Supreme Court unanimously rejects a request by the Port of New York-New Jersey Authority for a stay of a lower court ruling on September 20 that lifted the ban on landings at Kennedy International Airport, New York, of the British-French supersonic Concorde airplane.

## VATICAN

Oct. 29—Pope Paul VI ends a 4-week synod of the leading prelates of the Roman Catholic Church in Rome with an appeal to all governments to respect human rights.

## VIETNAM

Oct. 1—It is reported that the Hanoi government has asked the Danish government for emergency food aid because of a shortage of rice; the shortage is 2 million tons, almost 20 percent of Vietnam's normal production.

## YUGOSLAVIA

Oct. 24—It is reported that President Josip Broz Tito's wife, Jovanka, has been under house arrest since mid-June. She is currently being investigated at President Tito's request by a special commission; she is suspected of trying to influence major government appointments.

## ZAMBIA

(See Rhodesia)

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## RHODESIA AND HER NEIGHBORS

(Continued from page 229)

the Smith regime continued to stand in the way. In elections held on August 31, Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party defeated the more conservative elements in the country. This landslide victory gave Smith greater flexibility in seeking a settlement on his own terms. In effect, he received a mandate from the white minority for any action he proposes.

After further talks with representatives of the five Front Line States, the Patriotic Front and Prime Minister Vorster, a new Anglo-American peace plan was presented to the Rhodesian Prime Minister. The major elements of the plan included:

1. the surrender of power by the Rhodesian regime and amnesty for its members;
2. the establishment of an interim government under British supervision, backed by an international peace-keeping force under United Nations control;
3. disbanding the Rhodesian army (not the police) and its replacement by a new African army based on the liberation forces;
4. independence in 1978;
5. free and impartial elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage;
6. the provision of a Zimbabwe Development Fund of at least \$1 billion to spur economic development. The United States and Britain would be major contributors to the fund.

Smith criticized the plan but did not immediately reject it. However, he balked at the proposal to replace

the Rhodesian forces with elements of the armies of the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front attacked the proposal to set up a neutral international force in an interim government before majority rule. Of the Front Line Presidents only Kaunda, Khama and Nyerere were inclined to support the new plan.


For the first time, the demise of Rhodesia's white government seemed imminent. The loopholes in sanctions began to close after March, 1977, when the United States Congress repealed the Byrd amendment, which had allowed Americans to import Rhodesian chrome since 1971 in defiance of a United Nations boycott. Moreover, faced with an escalating white emigration and losses in foreign exchange, the Rhodesian government faced the probability of stepped-up guerrilla action on three fronts after the onset of the November rains. Over 10,000 black Rhodesians were undergoing training in Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia, Angola and Tanzania and fully 3,500 guerrillas were openly recruiting within the country. Both Mugabe's and Nkomo's partisans had infiltrated Rhodesian military units, making it almost impossible to distinguish between friend and foe. Some observers began to predict that a massive white exodus alone might trigger a rapid Cambodia-type collapse of white minority rule and lead to a general insurrection.

But nagging questions remained. Is the Patriotic Front capable of governing an independent Zimbabwe? When black majority rule is finally achieved, will the rival ZAPU-ZANU armies bury the hatchet? Will they easily return to a quiet civilian life? And what of the factor of tribalism or ethnicity? Can Mugabe's army, which is overwhelmingly Shona, a tribe comprising 80 percent of the population, co-exist with Nkomo's Ndebele, who number only 20 percent of the total?


At the moment, Mugabe and Nkomo lack a strong electoral base in Rhodesia. If they lose in the event of an early election would they be willing to step down? The African nationalist movement has been divided since 1961, when the original ANC split into ZAPU and ZANU. Since 1974, the Presidents of the Front Line States have tried, and failed, to unite them. Each time, ideological and personality differences between the leaders have proved more enduring. What great force or event will unite them? Will Sino-Soviet rivalry or Western capitalist involvement act as a divisive threat to unity within the nationalist ranks?

It is unlikely that the denouement of the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean drama will come with the transition to black majority rule. Rather, independence may signal the opening of a new, more violent act, including civil war. Unfortunately, the people of Zimbabwe will probably not be able to forge their own destiny for years to come. Since the colonial era, the political and economic status of that strategically situated land has affected its neighbors, and for that reason Zimbabwe's future will be inextricably involved with them.

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# Nations of Africa



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